[IP] more on comments on NIST "Draft Report on Voting System Vulnerability"
Begin forwarded message:
From: L Jean Camp <ljean@xxxxxxxxx>
Date: December 4, 2006 6:17:35 PM EST
To: dave@xxxxxxxxxx
Subject: Re: [IP] comments on NIST "Draft Report on Voting System
Vulnerability"
We have a process and a history. We can no more dump that process
than can we dump english and select a superior language. I know many
many people advocate movement towards a professional civil service
for voting oversight. Others believe that this is impossible, and
embrace the hackery so often common now as better than smooth
professional subversion. Whatever the case, we certainly should not
adopt a technology that fails to fit the process.
We also should not adopt a single mechanism for voting that is,
excuse me, patented by the person advocating it.
Here are some basic recommendations, none of which require major
reconfiguration of the process.
• Open Technology
The acquisition and evaluation of election and voting technology
should be subject to public participation. Further, symposium
participants advocate the use of open code in electronic systems to
facilitate transparency. EAC and NIST voting standards should be open
and implemented freely.
• The Power of Hybrid Electronic-Paper Voting Systems
Paper and electronic systems each have unique and potentially
complementary strengths. Electronic systems can provide fast counts,
suitable ballots, and ease the vast logistics problems of voting.
Paper provides auditable counts, ease of use, and voter confidence.
Emphasis on accurate vote counting must be balanced with speed – a
tally can be quick or rigorous, but not both.
• Rigorous Testing
Rigorous testing and certification of electronic voting technologies
is needed, for security, reliability, and usability. Such testing
should be led by NIST and the EAC and should be implemented quickly.
• Focus on The Human Element
With improved technologies, the people who administer elections
matter more, not less. More training, additional incentives and
improved remuneration for poll workers is needed immediately.
• Technically Appropriate Processes
Processes should be designed to address the unique strengths and
weaknesses of particular voting systems. Process design should assume
that failure will occur and address the possibility of failure before
an election. There should be agreed-upon rules for resolution of
uncertainty before the conflict occurs.
• Auditing
There should be extensive random auditing of election outcomes as
well as a binding reconciliation process. Ballots should be tracked
through a custody chain.
http://www.ljean.com
Net Trust http://code.google.com/p/nettrust/
Economics of Security http://www.infosecon.net/
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