Re: Medienfinte um "Streichung von Artikel 3"
On 23 Sep 2003, at 0:31, Erich M wrote:
> // Derzeit gibt es jedoch ein weiteres Gerücht, welches glaubwürdiger
> // erscheint: wenn das Europäische Parlament die Richtlinie
> wesentlich // verbessern und damit die Interessen der
> Softwarepatent-Inhaber schmälern // sollte, werden diese Freunde im
> Europäischen Rat, z.B. BMJ und britische // Regierung, die Richtlinie
> zu Fall bringen.
>
> Gerade die Briten haben ihre eigene, regionalen Patentgesetze
> restriktiver gehandhabt als andere in Europa, wurde mir gestern
> nachmittag telefonisch vom EPA erklärt. Weiss noch nicht, ob das
> stimmt.
Die geplante RiLi wird im "Codecision"-Verfahren gemacht: Ohne den
Rat laeuft _nichts_.
http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/cig/g4000c.htm
----------------------------- CUT --------------------------------
[...]
Codecision procedure
The codecision procedure (Article 251 of the EC Treaty, formerly
Article 189b) was introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht. It gives
the European Parliament the power to adopt instruments jointly with
the Council. The procedure comprises one, two or three readings. It
has the effect of increasing contacts between the Parliament and the
Council, the co-legislators, and with the European Commission. In
practice, it has strengthened the Parliament's legislative powers in
the following fields: the free movement of workers, right of
establishment, services, the internal market, education (incentive
measures), health (incentive measures), consumer policy, trans-
European networks (guidelines), environment (general action
programme), culture (incentive measures) and research (framework
programme).
The Treaty of Amsterdam has simplified the codecision procedure,
making it quicker and more effective and strengthening the role of
the Parliament. In addition it has been extended to new areas such as
social exclusion, public health and the fight against fraud affecting
the European Community's financial interests.
Increasing the democratic nature of Community action requires the
Parliament to participate in exercising legislative power. Thus, any
legislative instrument adopted by qualified majority is likely to
fall within the scope of the codecision procedure. In most cases,
therefore, codecision in the Parliament goes hand in hand with
qualified majority voting in the Council. For some provisions of the
Treaty, however, codecision and unanimity still coexist.
The Treaty of Nice partially puts an end to this situation. The
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) launched in February 2000 called
for an extension of the scope of codecision, in parallel with and as
a supplement to the extension of qualified majority voting in the
Council. Seven provisions for which the IGC planned to apply
qualified majority voting are thus also subject to codecision. They
are: incentives to combat discrimination, judicial cooperation in
civil matters, specific industrial support measures, economic and
social cohesion actions (outside the Structural Funds), the statute
for European political parties and measures relating to visas, asylum
and immigration. On the other hand, the IGC did not extend the
codecision procedure to legislative measures already subject to
qualified majority voting (such as agricultural or commercial
policy). There is therefore no definitive link yet between qualified
majority voting and the codecision procedure for all legislative
decisions.
[...]
----------------------------- CUT --------------------------------
Wenn das Europaeische Parlament den Bogen ueberspannt und eine 1:1
FFII-kompatible Fassung beschliesst, wird das danach dann
schliesslich sicherlich am Rat scheitern.
Wo genau die Schmerzschwelle liegen wird, ab der der Rat die Schose
kippt, kann ich aber auch nicht abschaetzen.
--AHH
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