Re: [Full-Disclosure] Clear text password exposure in Datakey's tokens and smartcards
Toomas Soome wrote:
Lionel Ferette wrote:
Note that this is true for almost all card readers on the market, not
only for Datakey's. Having worked for companies using crypto smart
cards, I have conducted a few risk analysis about that. The
conclusion has always been that if the PIN must be entered from a PC,
and the attacker has means to install software on the system (through
directed viruses, social engineering, etc), the game's over.
The only solution against that problem is to have the PIN entered
using a keypad on the reader. Only then does the cost of an attack
raise significantly. But that is opening another can of worms,
because there is (was?) no standard for card readers with attached
pin pad (at the time, PC/SCv2 wasn't finalised - is it?).
at least some cards are supporting des passphrases to implement
secured communication channels but I suppose this feature is not that
widely in use.... how many card owners are prepared to remember both
PIN codes and passphrases...
toomas
Perhaps I'm missing something here. As far as I can tell, no keys
located on the card were compromised, only the PIN was. Since this is a
two factor authentication system, possession of the PIN is of little
value without possession of the token itself.
Am I missing the point here?
regards,
-lee
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