[IP] more on a new DoD Internet voting scheme
Begin forwarded message:
From: gep2@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Date: October 26, 2006 1:36:17 AM EDT
To: dave@xxxxxxxxxx
Subject: Re: [IP] a new DoD Internet voting scheme
The bigger problem (and one for which there is ABSOLUTELY no
technical solution whatsoever, and which by itself ought to be a deal-
breaker) is very simply that there is NO conceivable way to make sure
that the voter is not voting under duress.
There is NO way to ensure that the voter is not voting with a gun
held to their head (figuratively, or even LITERALLY).
Their voting could be being "watched" over their shoulder by an
employer, a health care giver, a welfare case worker, a parent, a
child, a college professor, a landlord, a spouse, a union shop
steward, or indeed almost anybody in a position of power and
influence over the voter. There is no way to be sure that the voter
is not "selling" their vote (for drugs, sex, alcohol, money, or
whatever).
While the same argument can be made about mailin ballots in general,
those in most places represent a small percentage of the total vote;
if Internet voting were to become widespread, it could easily become
60% or more of the total vote, and with an inherent and
uncontrollable risk of fraud... in fact, it would be an irresistable
target for it.
One of the key things that happens in a poll location is that the
election workers ENSURE that the voting is anonymous and private, and
that when the voter leaves the polling place, NOBODY can find out how
that individual voter voted.
It is EXTREMELY important that people understand the significance of
this problem... that is why we MUST not allow Internet voting...!
On Wed, 25 Oct 2006 13:25:54 -0400
David Farber <dave@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Begin forwarded message:
From: Barbara Simons <simons@xxxxxxx>
Date: October 25, 2006 1:23:21 PM EDT
To: Dave Farber <dave@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: info@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: a new DoD Internet voting scheme
Dear Dave,
PLEASE CIRCULATE:
My colleagues David Jefferson, Avi Rubin, David Wagner and I have
just released a short paper about the government's IVAS system
that involves absentee voting using email and fax and ballot
distribution over the Internet. See
http://servesecurityreport.org/ivas.pdf
We wanted to bring this to your attention because we believe this
system poses significant risks, as described in this excerpt from
our article:
In summary, we see three main risks:
1. Tool One exposes soldiers to risks of identity theft. Sending
personally identifiable information via unencrypted email is
considered poor practice. No bank would ask their customers to
send SSNs over unencrypted email, yet Tool One does exactly that.
This problem is exacerbated by potential phishing attacks.
2. Returning voted ballots by email or fax creates an opportunity
for hackers, foreign governments, or other parties to tamper with
those ballots while they are in transit. FVAP's system does not
include any meaningful protection against the risk of ballot
modification.
3. Ballots returned by email or fax may be handled by the DoD in
some cases. Those overseas voters using the system sign a waiver
of their right to a secret ballot. However, it is one thing for a
voter's ballot to be sent directly to their local election
official; it is another for a soldier's ballot to be sent to and
handled by the DoD – who is, after all, the soldier's employer.
Regards,
Barbara Simons
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