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[IP] more on Can you be compelled to give a password?



Begin forwarded message:

From: Lauren Weinstein <lauren@xxxxxxxxxx>
Date: August 8, 2006 8:56:14 PM EDT
To: dave@xxxxxxxxxx
Cc: lauren@xxxxxxxxxx
Subject: Re: [IP] more on Can you be compelled to give a password?


Dave,

I wonder how long all of these fascinating, sophisticated techniques
will hold up when persons are threatened with:

  a) Lengthy extended prison terms for not coughing up exactly
     the demanded data with no screwing around ...

  and/or:

  b) Coercive techniques of the sort that the White House implied
     they could continue to use (as noted in the signing statement
     for an anti-torture bill) at their discretion

--Lauren--
Lauren Weinstein
lauren@xxxxxxxxxx or lauren@xxxxxxxx
Tel: +1 (818) 225-2800
http://www.pfir.org/lauren
Co-Founder, PFIR
   - People For Internet Responsibility - http://www.pfir.org
Co-Founder, IOIC
   - International Open Internet Coalition - http://www.ioic.net
Moderator, PRIVACY Forum - http://www.vortex.com
Member, ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy
Lauren's Blog: http://lauren.vortex.com
DayThink: http://daythink.vortex.com

  - - -




Begin forwarded message:

From: Ed Gerck <edgerck@xxxxxxx>
Date: August 8, 2006 5:49:21 PM EDT
To: Ariel Waissbein <wata.34mt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Cryptography <cryptography@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: Re: [IP] more on Can you be compelled to give a password?

Ariel Waissbein wrote:
Please notice that a second "distress" password becomes useless if the 
would-be user of this password has access to the binaries (that is,
the
encrypted data), e.g., because he will copy them before inserting the
password and might even try to reverse-engineer the decryption
software
before typing anything. So I'm not sure what is the setting here.
The worst-case setting for the user is likely to be when the coercer can do all that you said and has the time/resources to do them. However, if 
the distress password is strong (ie, not breakable within the time/
resources
available to the coercer), the distress password can be used (for
example)
to create a key that decrypts a part of the code in the binary data that 
says the distress password expired at an earlier date -- whereas the
access
password would create a key that decrypts another part of the code.

There are other possibilities as well. For example, if the binary data
contains code that requires connection to a server (for example, to
supply
the calculation of some function), that server can prevent any further
access, even if the access password is entered, after the distress
password
is given. The data becomes inaccessible even if the coercer has the
binary data.
Another possibility is to combine the above with threshold cryptography. 

Cheers,
Ed Gerck

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