[IP] more on NYC to search transit riders' bags -- but ... ???

[David Farber <dave@xxxxxxxxxx>]

Begin forwarded message:

From: Jonathan Weinberg <weinberg@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: July 25, 2005 11:32:06 AM EDT
To: dave@xxxxxxxxxx, Ip ip <ip@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: btm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: Re: [IP] more on NYC to search transit riders' bags -- but ...


At 07:16 PM 7/24/2005 -0400, David Farber wrote:

> Begin forwarded message:
> From: Brad Templeton <btm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Date: July 24, 2005 5:08:38 PM EDT
> To: David Farber <dave@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Rick.Adams@xxxxxxxxx
> Subject: Re: [IP] more on NYC to search transit riders' bags --  
> but ...
>
> Random or selected searches are not really a means of catching
> attacks.   They are a deterrent, or a means of increasing the
> cost of attacks.  If the attackers fear being caught, the random
> search (or even the selected search they haven't figured a way around)
> in theory should deter them from attacking at all -- if their view of
> the risk of capture is high enough.
>
> If they are suicide attackers, they don't so much fear getting caught
> and punished as they fear wasting themselves/being wasted and  
> attaining
> nothing.   One severeley hopes that suicide attackers are a scarce
> resource for the terrorists(*).   Random searches may convince them
> to use those resources elsewhere -- which is about the most anybody
> can do.


        So how should we evaluate a system like New York's, which  
employs random searches, but also gives each person the option of  
withdrawing and avoiding search, so that no attacker need ever fear  
being caught?

Jon


Jonathan Weinberg
Professor of Law, Wayne State University
weinberg@xxxxxxxxx




-------------------------------------
You are subscribed as roessler@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
To manage your subscription, go to
 http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip

Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/