[IP] Dvorak on eVoting: True Audit
Begin forwarded message:
From: Barry Ritholtz <ritholtz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: November 4, 2004 6:49:09 AM EST
To: Dave Farber <dave@xxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: Dvorak on eVoting: True Audit
Hey Dave,
PC Magazine columnist John C. Dvorak has some good common sense advice
regarding the future of eVotiing . . .
Barry L. Ritholtz
Chief Market Strategist
Maxim Group
britholtz@xxxxxxxxxxxx
(212) 895-3614
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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True audit of the Diebold machine
Commentary: Easy to use, but threats remain
By John C. Dvorak
Last Update: 8:29 PM ET Nov. 2, 2004
http://cbs.marketwatch.com/news/story.asp?
dist=¶m=archive&siteid=google&guid=%7B0DBD4D54%2D61F1%2D4C35%2DB66C%
2D3B82871D4C47%7D&garden=&minisite=
SAN FRANCISCO (CBS.MW) -- This is the second election in which I voted
via the Diebold voting machine. In my community here in Northern
California, we are asked what method we'd like to use -- paper or
computerized voting machine. I, like everyone else in the room, chose
the computer.
This is despite the fact that people are fearful that an election can
be rigged with the machines. I also do not see the system as foolproof,
but I'm certain that with a simple fix it can be close to perfect.
When I went in to vote I immediately studied the current methodology.
The process begins with the voter being handed a smart card that
appears to be reset by a precinct worker with a small hand held device.
When inserted into the Diebold machine, made by North Canton,
Ohio-based Diebold Inc. the machine sees this fresh card and begins the
voting process. The software is outstanding and the equipment very
usable. It's easy to change votes and you get a full review at the end
of the process. After you finalize your vote the small smart card is
released. The votes are accumulated at a base station and there is data
redundancy in case the power goes down, or whatever.
That said I still see weaknesses in this system that need fixing. To
begin with, the smart card basis for starting the machine seems weak. I
imagine scenarios where a smart card reset system is stolen and a voter
resets the cards a few times and votes over and over.
The vote count, of course, must be compared to the voter tally kept at
the front desk. If 400 people show up to vote there should be 400
votes, not 403. But if there are indeed 403, then what happens? An
audit can take place, but there is no real way to resolve this sort of
thing.
A corrupt precinct could easy knock up the votes too, but this can be
done with any methodology, so it's not any easier with the computer.
But this is all nickel-and-dime cheating. What the computer offers is
the opportunity to steal or fake thousands and thousand of votes all at
once through a clever hack. While I find the possibility of this
happening during this election remote, I can see it happening in the
future. And this is where the danger lies in computerized voting
machines. Once they are established and once they work well (like this
time) they will become commonplace. And the longer they are commonplace
the more exposure they have to hackers and cheats.
The key to making sure that this doesn't happen is a new auditing
methodology since there is no longer a paper trail. And, in fact, with
today's computer technology this should be easy and Diebold and the
other makers of these machines should consider my proposition, which
I'll outline here.
It would quite simple for the computer to assign a numerical value to
all the possible iterations that could be extrapolated from any ballot
no matter how long.
So here is the scenario. A person would cast his or her vote. At the
end a small two-part slip of paper would be printed from a small
bar-code printer hooked to the machine or even a more centralized
printer.
The small print-out would have a voter receipt on one half and a bar
code on the other that would represent the votes cast by the voter. The
voter would tear this in half and place the bar code in a ballot box
and keep the other half.
There would be a bar-code reader in the room to validate the votes if
the voter was concerned about accuracy. The sealed ballot box
containing all the bar-coded little pieces of paper would be the paper
trail and final back up for serious audits of districts.
It would only be used for recounts, catastrophic system failures and
spot checks as needed. Most of the time, it would never be looked at.
But it would be there just in case. Currently there is no paper trail
and with computers it's needed badly.
If Diebold and the other companies are smart they'll add this
inexpensive feature and allow everyone to sleep just a little better at
night, knowing that the cheaters can't as easily cheat.
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