[IP] more on (wiith comments by djf) NYTimes.com Article: Why We Fear the Digital Ballot
Begin forwarded message:
From: L Jean Camp <jean_camp@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: September 28, 2004 11:45:07 AM EDT
To: dave@xxxxxxxxxx
Subject: Re: [IP] more on (wiith comments by djf) NYTimes.com Article:
Why We Fear the Digital Ballot
Here is the executive summary of a voting report from bringing together
voting and technical professionals.
The basic problem I have seen is this:
1. voting officials think the technology is magic.
2. technologists do not appreciate the vast logistical difficulties
that voting officials face.
Oh yes, and the entire system of politics is filed with a mixture of
amazing hard-working decent people (some misguided) and the truly
venal.
The only thing we have time for now are paper ballots.
I strongly recommend that people vote absentee NOW, and physically
deliver their ballots.
report: http://www.designforvalues.org/voting
////
Overview of Annotated Best Practices
The symposium on voting and technology identified key themes that ran
throughout our discussions, and which will be highlighted in this
document. These ideas are summarized below.
• Open Technology
The acquisition and evaluation of election and voting technology should
be subject to public participation. Further, symposium participants
advocate the use of open code in electronic systems to facilitate
transparency. EAC and NIST voting standards should be open and
implemented freely.
• The Power of Hybrid Electronic-Paper Voting Systems
Paper and electronic systems each have unique and potentially
complementary strengths. Electronic systems can provide fast counts,
suitable ballots, and ease the vast logistics problems of voting. Paper
provides auditable counts, ease of use, and voter confidence. Emphasis
on accurate vote counting must be balanced with speed – a tally can be
quick or rigorous, but not both.
• Rigorous Testing
Rigorous testing and certification of electronic voting technologies is
needed, for security, reliability, and usability. Such testing should
be led by NIST and the EAC and should be implemented quickly.
• Focus on The Human Element
With improved technologies, the people who administer elections matter
more, not less. More training, additional incentives and improved
remuneration for poll workers is needed immediately.
• Technically Appropriate Processes
Processes should be designed to address the unique strengths and
weaknesses of particular voting systems. Process design should assume
that failure will occur and address the possibility of failure before
an election. There should be agreed-upon rules for resolution of
uncertainty before the conflict occurs.
• Auditing
There should be extensive random auditing of election outcomes as well
as a binding reconciliation process. Ballots should be tracked through
a custody chain.
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