[IP] more on more on What if Cat Stevens had flown under a different name?
Begin forwarded message:
From: "John S. Quarterman" <jsq@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: September 24, 2004 5:47:09 PM EDT
To: dave@xxxxxxxxxx
Cc: "John S. Quarterman" <jsq@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Ip <ip@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: Re: [IP] more on more on What if Cat Stevens had flown under a
different name?
For IP.
From: Steve Bellovin <smb@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: September 23, 2004 9:01:06 PM EDT
To: dave@xxxxxxxxxx
Cc: "sbaker@xxxxxxxxxxx" <sbaker@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: more on more on What if Cat Stevens had flown under a
different name?
Stewart Baker asks a good question: why do so many people (and not just
on this list) complain about proactive data gathering (such as CAPPS
II) while simultaneously noting the difficulty in disambiguating names
without broader context.
I think it's not a contradiction; it's a red herring. If a watchlist
was useful, why after three years hasn't it succeeded in catching any
actual terrorists? One can argue that it would be more effective with
more data gathering, but zero times any increased factor of
effectiveness
is still zero. Maybe I've missed hearing about some actual terrorists
being caught this way; if so, somebody please point out such cases.
When data is gathered, it *will* be used for other purposes. According
to last Sunday's NY Times, in fact, that sort of mission creep was the
problem that sunk CAPPS II. (For those who are interested, see
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/19/politics/19secure.html -- it explains
how, according to FOIAed documents, the systems was not going to be
used just for protecting flights, but also for finding people wanted
for many other sorts of violent crime, and maybe more -- the legitimate
recipients of matches include "other federal agencies conducting
litigation".)
Rudy Giuliano's cleanup of NYC used a similar tactic, collaring people
at subway turnstiles who went through without paying their fare. Many
people wanted for other, sometimes much more serious, crimes were
caught.
The difference is: going through a turnstile without paying was a crime.
Last I heard, getting on an airplane after paying the airfare isn't a
crime.
In the case of Yusuf Islam, according to the Voice of America:
``U.S. Homeland Security officials would only say Mr. Islam is on
the lists because of "activities that could be potentially linked
to terrorism."''
http://www.voanews.com/article.cfm?objectID=348670BC-3623-4CC1
-8EB18CC50BACE4FB&title=British%20Singer%20Yusuf%20Islam%20Plans%20Legal
%20Action%20over%20US%20Deportation&catOID=45C9C78C-88AD-11D4-
A57200A0CC5EE46C&categoryname=Europe
Potentially?
Hm, so if any of us bought Cat Stevens records (looks like he's released
a couple in the past year), might we be linked by the royalties he got
to whatever his activities might be and thus also be potentially linked
to terrorism? What if we went to one of his concerts?
One of the main points of the subway turnstile collars was to improve
the context of subway travel, so as to have an indirect yet powerful
effect on reducing crime.
If there was actually a reason for Yusuf Islam (a well-known
philanthropist who has frequently spoken out against terrorism) being
deported, perhaps the U.S. government will inform its good ally the
British government, as Jack Straw requested of Colin Powell at the UN,
so that the British government can pursue appropriate action against
him.
If not, I'm puzzled as to how a watchlist that stops U.S. Congressmen
(Sen. Ted Kennedy, Rep. John R. Lewis)
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/823083.cms
and an internationally known philanthropist while producing no true
positives
is improving the context of air travel or directly increasing security.
Maybe somebody can explain this.
John S. Quarterman <jsq@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
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