[IP] Interesting article on security and disclosure...
Begin forwarded message:
From: "Faulhaber, Gerald" <faulhabe@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: September 8, 2004 4:34:03 PM EDT
Subject: Interesting article on security and disclosure...
...I have the full article if anyone wants it. If you subscribe to
SSRN, you can get it at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=531782
A Model for when Disclosure Helps Security: What Is Different About
Computer and Network Security?
PETER P. SWIRE
Moritz College of Law of the Ohio State University
Journal on Telecommunications and High Technology Law, Forthcoming
Abstract:
This Article asks the question: When does disclosure actually help
security? The discussion begins with a paradox. Most experts in
computer and network security are familiar with the slogan that there
is no security through obscurity. The Open Source and encryption view
is that revealing the details of a system will actually tend to improve
security, notably due to peer review. In sharp contrast, a famous World
War II slogan says loose lips sink ships. Most experts in the military
and intelligence areas believe that secrecy is a critical tool for
maintaining security. Both cannot be right - disclosure cannot both
help and hurt security.
Using a law and economics approach to resolve the paradox, Part I
provides a model for deciding when either the Open Source or the
military/intelligence viewpoints is likely to be correct. The model
analyzes the costs and benefits of disclosure for both attackers and
defenders. The model also sheds light on when disclosure is likely to
provide net benefits in two other important cases: information sharing
(such as between the FBI and the CIA) and the public domain.
Part II explains why many computer and network security problems appear
different from the traditional security problems of the physical world.
The analysis focuses on the nature of the first-time attack or the
degree of what the paper calls uniqueness in the defense. Many
defensive tricks, including secrecy, are more effective the first time
there is an attack on a physical base or computer system. Secrecy is
far less effective, however, if the attackers can probe the defenses
repeatedly and learn from those probes. It turns out that many of the
key areas of computer security involve circumstances where there can be
repeated, low-cost attacks. For instance, firewalls, mass-market
software, and encryption algorithms all can be attacked repeatedly by
hackers. Under such circumstances, a strategy of secrecy - of security
through obscurity - is less likely to be effective than for the
military case.
Part III applies the analytic tools developed earlier in the paper to
issues including the following: the enlargement of the public domain in
a world of search engines; the relationship between disclosure and
deterrence; the importance of not disclosing passwords or the
combination to a safe; why secrecy in surveillance may improve security
(while also threatening other important values); and variables that
affect when Open Source or proprietary software may provide better
security. Part III also explains how the academic literature on the
Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis can illuminate important issues in
computer and network security.
In short, this Article provides the first systematic explanation of how
to decide when disclosure improves security, both for physical- and
cyber-security settings
Professor Gerald R. Faulhaber
Business and Public Policy Dept.
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, PA 19104
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