[IP] "Plan of Attack" (I)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A19691-2004Apr17.html
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Behind Diplomatic Moves, Military Plan Was Launched
'We're Going to Have to Go to War,' Bush Said to Rice
By Bob Woodward
Washington Post Staff Writer
Sunday, April 18, 2004; Page A01
Shortly after New Year's Day 2003, national security adviser Condoleezza
Rice had a private moment with President Bush at his ranch in Crawford, Tex.
Bush felt the effort to get United Nations weapons inspections inside Iraq
on an aggressive track to make Saddam Hussein crack was not working. "This
pressure isn't holding together," Bush told her.
The media reports of smiling Iraqis leading inspectors around, opening up
buildings and saying, "See, there's nothing here," infuriated Bush, who
then would read intelligence reports showing the Iraqis were moving and
concealing things. It wasn't clear what was being moved, but it looked to
Bush as if Hussein was about to fool the world again. It looked as if the
inspections effort was not sufficiently aggressive, would take months or
longer, and was likely doomed to fail.
"I was concerned people would focus on not Saddam, not the danger that he
posed, not his deception, but focus on the process and thereby Saddam would
be able to kind of skate through once again," Bush recalled in an interview
last December.
"I felt stressed," he added. All the holiday parties at the White House had
not helped. "My jaw muscle got so tight. And it was not just because I was
smiling and shaking so many hands. There was a lot of tension during that
last holiday season."
There was another factor at work that was not publicly known. Sensitive
intelligence coverage on U.N. inspections chief Hans Blix indicated that he
was not reporting everything and not doing all the things he maintained he
was doing. Some in Bush's war cabinet believed Blix was a liar.
"How is this happening?" Bush asked Rice. "Saddam is going to get stronger."
Blix had told Rice, "I have never complained about your military pressure.
I think it's a good thing." She relayed this to the president.
"How long does he think I can do this?" Bush asked. "A year? I can't. The
United States can't stay in this position while Saddam plays games with the
inspectors."
"You have to follow through on your threat," Rice said. "If you're going to
carry out coercive diplomacy, you have to live with that decision."
"He's getting more confident, not less," Bush said of Hussein. "He can
manipulate the international system again. We're not winning.
"Time is not on our side here," Bush told Rice. "Probably going to have to,
we're going to have to go to war."
In Rice's mind, this was the moment the president decided the United States
would go to war with Iraq. Military planning had been underway for more
than a year even as Bush sought a diplomatic solution through the United
Nations. He would continue those efforts, at least publicly, for 10 more
weeks, but he had reached a point of no return.
The president also informed Karl Rove, his chief political strategist, of
his decision over the holidays. Rove had gone to Crawford to brief Bush on
the confidential plan for Bush's 2004 reelection campaign. While Laura Bush
sat reading a book, Rove gave a PowerPoint presentation on the campaign's
strategy, themes and timetable.
Opening his laptop, he displayed for Bush in bold letters on a dark blue
background:
PERSONA:
Strong Leader
Bold Action
Big Ideas
Peace in World
More Compassionate America
Cares About People Like Me
Leads a Strong Team
All things being equal, the president asked, when would you like to begin
the campaign and active fundraising?
Rove said he wanted the president to start that February or March and begin
raising the money, probably $200 million. He had a schedule. In February,
March and April 2003, there would be between 12 and 16 fundraisers.
"We got a war coming," the president told Rove flatly, "and you're just
going to have to wait." He had decided. "The moment is coming." The
president did not give a date, but he left the impression with Rove that it
would be January or February or March at the latest.
"Remember the problem with your dad's campaign," Rove replied. "A lot of
people said he got started too late."
"I understand," Bush said. "I'll tell you when I'm comfortable with you
starting."
Bush Orders a War Plan
Rice was the only member of his war cabinet whom Bush directly asked for a
recommendation of whether to go to war.
"What do you think?" he had asked her a few weeks before. "Should we do this?"
"Yes," she said. "Because it isn't American credibility on the line, it is
the credibility of everybody that this gangster can yet again beat the
international system." As important as credibility was, she said,
"Credibility should never drive you to do something you shouldn't do." But
this was much bigger, she advised, something that should be done. "To let
this threat in this part of the world play volleyball with the
international community this way will come back to haunt us someday. That
is the reason to do it."
Other than Rice, Bush said he didn't need to ask the principal advisers
whether they thought he should go to war. He knew what Vice President
Cheney thought, and he decided not to ask Secretary of State Colin L.
Powell or Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld.
"I could tell what they thought," the president recalled. "I didn't need to
ask them their opinion about Saddam Hussein. If you were sitting where I
sit, you could be pretty clear. I think we've got an environment where
people feel free to express themselves."
One person not around was Karen Hughes, one of his top advisers and
longtime communications director. Hughes, who had resigned the previous
summer to return to Texas, probably knew how Bush thought and talked as
much as anyone.
"I asked Karen," the president recalled. "She said if you go to war,
exhaust all opportunities to achieve [regime change] peacefully. And she
was right. She actually captured my own sentiments."
More than a year before -- on Nov. 21, 2001 -- Bush had told Rumsfeld that
he wanted to develop a plan for war in Iraq. Since that time the defense
secretary had been working closely with Gen. Tommy R. Franks, head of the
U.S. Central Command, and other U.S. commanders, as well as Bush and other
members of the war cabinet to develop a plan even as Bush pursued diplomacy
through the United Nations.
At times, White House Chief of Staff Andrew H. Card Jr. thought of Bush as
a circus rider with one foot on a "diplomacy" steed and his other on the
"war" steed, both reins in his hands, leading down a path to regime change.
Each horse had blinders on. It was now clear that diplomacy would not get
him to his goal, so Bush had let go of that horse and was standing only on
the war steed.
Rumsfeld had been trying to put himself in the president's shoes,
attempting to make sure that Bush didn't get so far out in words, body
language or mental state that he couldn't get back from a decision to go to
war as the United States built up forces around Iraq.
On the other hand, Rumsfeld felt there was a time when the president should
not want to walk back, and really could not. That time would be well before
Bush had to decide to put Special Operations Forces inside Iraq, the point
of no return identified by Franks.
"I can remember trying to give him as early a clue as possible that that
was coming down the road," Rumsfeld recalled in an interview.
"There comes a moment as all these things are happening," he added, "when
we have to look a neighboring country in the eye, and they have to make a
decision that puts them at risk. And at that moment, the president needs to
know that."
Back in Washington in early January 2003, Bush took Rumsfeld aside.
"Look, we're going to have to do this, I'm afraid," he said. "I don't see
how we're going to get him to a position where he will do something in a
manner that's consistent with the U.N. requirements, and we've got to make
an assumption that he will not."
It was enough of a decision for Rumsfeld. He asked to bring in some key
foreign players.
The president gave his approval but pressed Rumsfeld again. When is my last
decision point?
"When your people, Mr. President, look people in the eye and tell them
you're going."
One of the key players that had to be notified and brought along was Saudi
Arabia. U.S. forces would have to be sent through and from Saudi territory
into Iraq. Rescue, communications and refueling support were not going to
be enough. Of the five other countries on Iraq's border, only Kuwait and
Jordan supported a military operation. The 500 miles of Saudi-Iraqi border
were critical.
So on Saturday, Jan. 11, Cheney invited Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi
ambassador, to his West Wing office. Rumsfeld and Gen. Richard B. Myers,
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were also there.
Prince Bandar had served during four American presidencies. At age 53,
Bandar was almost a fifth estate in Washington, amplifying Saudi influence
and wealth. He insisted on dealing directly with presidents and is almost
family to Bush's father, former president George H. W. Bush. And he had
maintained his special entree to the Oval Office under this President Bush.
Sitting on the edge of the table in Cheney's office, Myers took out a large
map labeled TOP SECRET NOFORN. The NOFORN meant NO FOREIGN -- classified
material not to be seen by any foreign nation.
Myers explained that the first part of the battle plan would be a massive
aerial bombing campaign over several days against Iraq's Republican Guard
divisions, the security services and command and control of Hussein's
forces. A land attack would follow through Kuwait, plus a northern front
through Turkey with the 4th Infantry Division if Turkey approved it.
Included was massive use of Special Forces and intelligence paramilitary
teams to secure every place in Iraq from which Hussein could launch a
missile or airplane against Saudi Arabia, Jordan or Israel.
Special Forces and intelligence operatives would distribute $300 million to
local Iraqi tribal leaders, religious leaders and the Iraqi armed forces.
The Saudi-Iraqi border would have to be covered. Special Forces,
intelligence teams and other strikes would have to be launched from there.
If there were alternatives, Myers said, they would not be asking the Saudis.
Bandar knew that his country could create a cover for the arrival of U.S.
forces by closing a civilian airport at Al Jawf in the northern desert,
flying Saudi helicopters day and night as a routine border patrol for a
week, and then withdrawing. The U.S. Special Forces could set up a base
there that might not attract much attention.
Staring intently at the 2-by-3-foot Top Secret map, Bandar, a former
fighter pilot, asked a few questions about air operations. Could he have a
copy of the large map so he could brief Crown Prince Abdullah? he asked,
referring to the de facto leader of Saudi Arabia.
"Above my pay grade," Myers said.
"We'll give you all the information you want," Rumsfeld said. As for the
map, he added, "I would rather not give it to you, but you can take notes
if you want."
"No, no, it's not important. Just let me look at it," Bandar said. He tried
to take it all in -- the large ground thrusts, the location of Special
Forces or intelligence teams all designated on the map.
"You can count on this," Rumsfeld said, pointing to the map. "You can take
that to the bank. This is going to happen."
"What is the chance of Saddam surviving this?" Bandar asked. He believed
Hussein was intent on killing everyone involved at a high level with the
1991 Persian Gulf War, including himself.
Rumsfeld and Myers didn't answer.
"Saddam, this time, will be out, period?" Bandar asked skeptically. "What
will happen to him?"
Cheney, who had been quiet as usual, replied, "Prince Bandar, once we
start, Saddam is toast."
"I am convinced now that this is something I can take to my Prince
Abdullah," Bandar said, "and think I can convince him. But I cannot go and
tell him that Myers and Rumsfeld and you told me. I have to carry a message
from the president."
"I'll get back to you," the vice president replied. After Bandar had left,
Rumsfeld voiced some concern about the vice president's "toast" remark.
"Jesus Christ, what was that all about, Dick?"
"I didn't want to leave any doubt in his mind what we're planning to do,"
Cheney said.
In his car, Bandar scribbled out details from what he had seen on the map.
When he got home, he took a large blank map of the region that had been
supplied by the CIA and began reconstructing the plan piece by piece.
The next day, Sunday, Rice called Bandar to invite him to meet with the
president the following day, Monday, Jan. 13. At the meeting, the president
told Bandar that he was receiving advice and reports from some in his
administration that in the event of war he would have to contend with a
massive Arab and Islamic reaction that would put American interests at risk.
"Mr. President, you're assuming you're attacking Saudi Arabia and trying to
capture King Fahd," Bandar said. "This is Saddam Hussein. People are not
going to shed tears over Saddam Hussein, but if he's attacked one more time
by America and he survives and stays in power after you've finished this,
whatever it is, yes, everybody will follow his word. If they say attack the
American Embassy, they will go and attack it."
Before the Gulf War in 1991, Bandar recalled for the president, "Go back to
look at what was said to your father -- the Arab world will rise from the
Atlantic to the Gulf!" Well, that didn't happen then, and it would not
happen this time, he said. The problem would be if Hussein survived. The
Saudis needed assurance that Hussein was going to be toast.
"You got the briefing from Dick, Rummy and General Myers?" the president asked.
"Yes."
"Any questions for me?"
No, Mr. President.
"That is the message I want you to carry for me to the crown prince," Bush
said. "The message you're taking is mine, Bandar."
"That's fine, Mr. President."
Bandar believed it was exactly what Cheney had told Bush to say.
"Anything else for me?"
No, Mr. President.
Bandar Told Ahead of Powell
One of Rice's jobs was, as she called it, "to read the secretaries": Powell
and Rumsfeld. Since the president had told Rumsfeld about his decision to
go to war, he had better tell Powell, and fast. Powell was close to Prince
Bandar, who now was informed of the decision.
"Mr. President," Rice said, "if you're getting to a place that you really
think this might happen, you need to call Colin in and talk to him." Powell
had the most difficult job, keeping the diplomatic track alive.
So that Monday, Jan. 13, Powell and Bush met in the Oval Office. The
president was sitting in his regular chair in front of the fireplace, and
the secretary was in the chair reserved for the visiting leader or most
senior U.S. official. For once, neither Cheney nor Rice was hovering.
Bush complimented Powell for his hard work on the diplomatic front. "The
inspections are not getting us there," the president said, getting down to
business. The U.N. inspectors were just sort of stumbling around, and
Hussein was showing no intention of real compliance. "I really think I'm
going to have to do this." The president said he had made up his mind on
war. The United States should go to war.
"You're sure?" Powell asked.
Yes, said Bush.
"You understand the consequences," Powell said in a half question. For
nearly six months, he had been hammering on this theme -- that the United
States would be taking down a regime, would have to govern Iraq, and the
ripple effect in the Middle East and the world could not be predicted. The
run-up to war had sucked nearly all the oxygen from every other issue in
foreign relations. War would surely get all the air and attention.
Yeah, I do, the president answered.
"You know that you're going to be owning this place?" Powell said,
reminding Bush of what he had told him at a dinner the previous August in
which Powell had made the case against military action in Iraq. An invasion
would mean assuming the hopes, aspirations and all the troubles of Iraq.
Powell wasn't sure whether Bush had fully understood the meaning and
consequences of total ownership.
But I think I have to do this, the president said.
Right, Powell said.
I just want to let you know that, Bush said, making it clear this was not a
discussion, but the president informing one of his Cabinet members of his
decision. The fork in the road had been reached and Bush had chosen war.
As the only person in Bush's inner circle who was seriously and actively
pressing the diplomatic track, Powell figured the president wanted to make
sure he would support the war. It was in some way a gut check, but Powell
didn't feel the president was making a loyalty check. No way on God's earth
could he walk away at that point. It would have been an unthinkable act of
disloyalty to the president, to Powell's own soldier's code, to the United
States military, and mostly to the several hundred thousand who would be
going to war.
"Are you with me on this?" the president asked him now. "I think I have to
do this. I want you with me."
"I'll do the best I can," Powell answered. "Yes, sir, I will support you.
I'm with you, Mr. President."
"Time to put your war uniform on," the president said to the retired general.
In all the discussions, meetings, chats and back-and-forth, in Powell's
grueling duels with Rumsfeld and Defense, the president had never once
asked Powell, Would you do this? What's your overall advice? The bottom line?
Perhaps the president feared the answer. Perhaps Powell feared giving it.
It would, after all, have been an opportunity to say he disagreed. But they
had not reached that core question, and Powell would not push. He would not
intrude on that most private of presidential space -- where a president
made decisions of war and peace -- unless he was invited. He had not been
invited.
Bush's meeting with Powell lasted 12 minutes. "It was a very cordial
conversation," the president recalled. "It wasn't a long conversation," he
noted. "There wasn't much debate: It looks like we're headed to war."
The president stated emphatically that though he had asked Powell to be
with him and support him in a war, "I didn't need his permission."
Poland Signs On to the War
Before a meeting with Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski the next day,
Jan. 14, Bush's frustration again flared in public as he shifted position
on the time remaining to Hussein. While eight days earlier he had said
publicly that the Iraqi president has "got time," he told reporters that
morning, "Time is running out on Saddam Hussein."
Bush knew he had no better friend on the European continent than the
popular, second-term Polish president who had agreed to send troops to the
war. The Bushes had hosted Kwasniewski and his wife for a rare state dinner
the previous July.
"The level of anti-Americanism is extremely high," Kwasniewski said at
their private meeting. He had a serious political problem because of his
support for Bush.
"Success helps change public opinion," Bush said. "Should we commit troops,
we'll feed the people of Iraq." He said it as if that humanitarian gesture
might have an impact on public opinion in Poland. He said there was a
protocol a country could follow to show the world that it was ridding
itself of unconventional weapons -- one that South Africa had followed,
visibly and aggressively opening up records and facilities for inspections.
Hussein had not.
"In my judgment it's time to move soon, but we won't act precipitously,"
Bush said, adding, "but time is running out. It's sooner rather than later."
"We will win," the Polish president said, but sounding like Colin Powell,
he added plaintively, "but what are the consequences?" After a pause, he
continued, "You need wide, broad international support. We are with you,
don't worry about it. The risk is the U.N. will collapse. What will replace
it?"
These were hard questions that Bush sidestepped, saying only, "We believe
that Islam like Christianity can grow in a free and democratic manner."
For Bush, the important things were that Poland would be with him and would
supply troops.
Mark Malseed contributed to this report.
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