[IP] more on Report on the use of uncertified software in California voting machines
Delivered-To: dfarber+@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2003 16:17:26 -0600
From: gep2@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [IP] Report on the use of uncertified software in California voting
machines
To: dave@xxxxxxxxxx, dallasdemocrats@xxxxxxxxxxx, USDemocrat@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
The worst part of this is that, I understand and contend, even the
"certification" of this software that HAS BEEN being done isn't nearly
adequate
to protect against cleverly designed software that can either skew the
election
results, or else provide backdoors and other loopholes by which such
manipulation of the election results can be done (by other software) and with
basically no recourse.
I've heard frightening stories about unsophisticated observers being
brought in,
watching "test voters" using the computerized systems, then going off to lunch
(!) and coming back to see the final counts. !!!!
Software (ALL the software!) used both in the voting machines, and in the
collection/tallying process, needs to be open to public inspection... so that
any competent open-source programmers who are interested can go over the
software with a fine-toothed comb and look for bugs, worms, and other
nasties in
it.
The ONLY viable approach I've seen so far to allow a viable recount and
audit of
election results is to have the computerized systems produce a permanent,
voter-verified paper copy of their ballot, that the voter can inspect and
approve before leaving the polling place.
The OTHER key issue regarding vote integrity involves the planned use of
Internet/online voting in at least several crucial states during the 2004
election. I believe that the TECHNICAL problems CAN be solved (although
I'm not
confident, given the record, that they WILL be) but one TERRIBLE problem that
CAN NOT be solved by ANY technical means is that there is no way to ensure
that
the online voter is not voting with a gun held to their head...
figuratively or
even literally.
It's reasonable to expect that at least a nontrivial number of online voters
will be voting with a parent, guardian, professor, landlord, spouse, union
shop
steward, welfare case worker, parole officer, employer, mortgage holder,
pastor,
drug dealer, thug, or someone else with strong "persuasive" power over the
voter, watching how they are voting.
While this has always been true of "mail-in" absentee ballots already, the
number of voters using those is always pretty much inconsequential. The
opportunity for abuse will be FAR, FAR higher given the large percentage of
the
vote (and the vulnerability to "influencing") that one would expect would
someday be voted online, and away from the watchful protection of responsible
and ethical election judges and poll officials.
<---- Begin Forwarded Message ---->
Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2003 15:56:24 -0500
To: ip@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
From: Dave Farber <dave@xxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: [IP] Report on the use of uncertified software in California voting
machines
Reply-To: dave@xxxxxxxxxx
author iunknown
Report on the use of uncertified software in California voting machines
Hi everyone,
This afternoon I attended a meeting of the California Secretary of
State's Voting Systems Panel, which is in charge of certifying and
decertifying voting systems for California elections.
At this meeting the initial results from the Secretary of State's
audit of counties using Diebold equipment were released. The
Secretary of State's auditors discovered that of the 17 counties
using Diebold equipment (both optical scan and touchscreen), all 17
had some software or firmware version in use that was not certified
by the Secretary of State.
It was an astonishing piece of information -- no one knew how
widespread the problem was of Diebold installing uncertified software
in voting systems as was discovered in Alameda County. It turns out
all of Diebold's California clients are using some version of Diebold
software or firmware that is not certified by the state.
The latest version of Diebold's GEMS software that was certified in
California is 117.17; the audit revealed that counties were using
other versions, such as 117.20, 117.22, 117.23, 118.18, and
118.18.02. The audit also revealed that three counties
-- Los
Angeles, Trinity and Lassen -- were using software versions that had
not been approved for use at the federal level.
It was a real bombshell. Secretary of State Kevin Shelley came into
the meeting to address the panel and spoke very firmly and
passionately about the need for voters to have confidence in
elections. He also suggested that it is possible Diebold could be
decertified in California altogether.
Not all the information the Secretary of State's auditors collected
has been analyzed. I understand there is a 66 page report that may
be available. The next meeting of the VSP will be held in
mid-January, around the 14th, to take up the Diebold audit matter
again as well as the development of voter verified paper audit trail
standards for California's computerized voting systems. The
Secretary of State also will conduct an audit over the next three
months of the 41 other California counties' voting systems to
determine whether their software and equipment is in compliance with
California law.
-- Kim Alexander
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