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[IP] Live Webcast of CMU SCS Distinguished Lecture (9/18, 4 pm EST)




Delivered-To: dfarber+@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2003 17:31:58 -0400
From: hzhang+@xxxxxxxxxx
Subject: Live Webcast of CMU SCS Distinguished Lecture (9/18, 4 pm EST)
To: dave@xxxxxxxxxx
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Dave,

this may be of interest to people on your list ...

Hui


 >
 > The following event will be broadcast live over the Internet.
 > For instruction on how to tune in, please check
 >
 >    http://esm.cs.cmu.edu/
 >
 > Event:   DISTINGUISHED LECTURE
 >            SCHOOL OF COMPUTER SCIENCE
 >            Carnegie Mellon University
 > Date:    Thursday, 18 September 2003
 > Time:    4:00 pm -5:00pm EDT
 >
 >         MAKING MARKETS AND DEMOCRACY WORK:
 >          A STORY OF INCENTIVES AND COMPUTING
 >
 >               TUOMAS SANDHOLM
 >
 >
 >          This talk is a representation of Dr. Sandholm's
 >          IJCAI "Computers and Thought Award" Lecture 2003.
 >
 >
 > ABSTRACT
 > ********
 > Collective choice settings are the heart of society. Game theory
 > provides a basis for engineering the incentives into the
 > interaction mechanism (e.g., rules of an election or auction) so
 > that a desirable system-wide outcome (e.g., president, resource
 > allocation, or task allocation) is chosen even though every agent
 > acts based on self-interest.
 >
 > However, there are a host of computer science issues not
 > traditionally addressed in game theory that have to be addressed
 > in order to make mechanisms work in the real world. Those computing,
 > communication, and privacy issues are deeply intertwined with the
 > economic incentive issues. For example, the fact that agents have
 > limited computational capabilities to determine their own (and others')
 > preferences ruins the incentive properties of established auction
 > mechanisms, and gives rise to new issues. On the positive side,
 > computational complexity can be used as a barrier to strategic
 > behavior in settings where economic mechanism design falls short.
 >
 > Novel computational approaches also enable new economic institutions.
 > For example, market clearing technology with specialized search
 > algorithms is enabling a form of interaction that I call expressive
 > competition. As another example, selective incremental preference
 > elicitation can determine the optimal outcome while requiring the
 > agents to determine and reveal only a small portion of their
 > preferences. Furthermore, automated mechanism design can yield
 > better mechanisms than the best known to date.
 >
 >
 > SPEAKER BIO
 > ***********
 > TUOMAS SANDHOLM is an associate professor in the Computer Science
 > Department at Carnegie Mellon University.  He received the Ph.D.
 > and M.S. degrees in computer science from the University of
 > Massachusetts at Amherst in 1996 and 1994.  He earned an M.S.
 > (B.S. included) with distinction in Industrial Engineering and
 > Management Science from the Helsinki University of Technology,
 > Finland, in 1991.  He has published over 160 technical papers on
 > artificial intelligence; electronic commerce; game theory; multiagent
 > systems; auctions and exchanges; automated negotiation and contracting;
 > coalition formation; voting; safe exchange; normative models of bounded
 > rationality; resource-bounded reasoning; machine learning; networks; and
 > combinatorial optimization.
 >
 > Dr. Sandholm has 13 years of experience building electronic
 > marketplaces, and several of his systems have been commercially
 > fielded.  He is also Founder, Chairman, and Chief Technology Officer
 > of CombineNet, Inc.  He received the National Science Foundation
 > Career Award in 1997, the inaugural ACM Autonomous Agents Research
 > Award in 2001, the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation Fellowship in 2003,
 > and the IJCAI Computers and Thought Award in 2003.
 >

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