MSL-2009-001 - Samsung Missing Provisioning Authentication
Security Advisory
MSL-2009-001 - Samsung Missing Provisioning Authentication
Advisory Information
--------------------
Title: Samsung Missing Provisioning Authentication
Advisory ID:
MSL-2009-001
Advisory URL:
http://www.mseclab.com/index.php?page_id=148
Published:
2009-04-23
Updated:
2009-04-23
Vendor:
Samsung
Vulnerability Details
---------------------
Class:
Authentication Bypass
Remote:
Yes
Local:
No
Public References:
Not Assigned
Affected:
Samsung M8800 Innov8
Samsung SGH-J750
Not Affected:
Unknown
Description:
Affected devices do not perform proper authentication of incoming SMS
Provisioning messages.
The following behaviors have been verified on affected devices:
1.Source of provisioning message is never displayed to user.
2.Unauthenticated SMS Provisioning messages, where SEC and MAC
parameters are not present in the message, are accepted. User is not
made aware that the received provisioning message is not authenticated.
3.Authenticated SMS Provisioning messages, where SEC and MAC parameters
are present in the message, are accepted, but the parameters are not
used for performing the security checks.
More specifically:
USERPIN authenticated provisioning message: device installs the received
configuration without performing any message authentication. PIN Code is
never asked to user and is not required for completing the installation.
The installation is correctly performed and the configuration is
installed as default.
NETWPIN authenticated provisioning messages: device installs the
received configuration without performing any message authentication.
Sender does not need to know the correct IMSI value in order to let the
device accepts the message as correct. The configuration will be
installed regardless of the MAC value present in the message.
By sending provisioning messages in one of the above specified ways, an
attacker could pose as a legitimate trusted source and entice a victim
into installing a malicious configuration.
Such an attack could lead to the hijacking of mobile data connections
originated by the device.
Solutions & Workaround:
Not available
Additional Information
----------------------
Timeline:
2009-04-04: Issue discovery
2009-04-06: Initial Vendor Notification: Point of Contact requested via
contact form on website (No suitable e-mail available)
2009-04-07: Vendor Response: Automated response
2009-04-23: Public Disclosure
Vendor Statement:
None
Further information available on http://www.mseclab.com
-- Mobile Security Lab Website: www.mseclab.com <http://www.mseclab.com>