iDefense Security Advisory 10.14.08: Microsoft Host Integration Server 2006 Command Execution Vulnerability
iDefense Security Advisory 10.14.08
http://labs.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/
Oct 14, 2008
I. BACKGROUND
The Host Integration Server is an application suite that is used to
communicate with IBM mainframe servers. One of the components of the
suite is a remote management interface. This interface is implemented
by an RPC server that listens on a dynamic TCP port. The UUID of the
vulnerable RPC service is 'ed6ee250-e0d1-11cf-925a-00aa00c006c1'. For
more information regarding the Host Integration Server, see the
vendor's website found at the following URL.
http://www.microsoft.com/hiserver/default.mspx
II. DESCRIPTION
Remote exploitation of an arbitrary command execution vulnerability in
Microsoft Corp.'s Host Integration Server 2006 could allow an attacker
to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the affected service.
The RPC interface exposes several methods that an unauthenticated
attacker can use to execute arbitrary programs on the server. RPC
opcodes 1 and 6 both allow an attacker to call the CreateProcess()
function with full control over the application started, as well as the
command line passed to it. This allows an attacker to run arbitrary
programs on the server.
III. ANALYSIS
Exploitation of this vulnerability results in the execution of arbitrary
code with the privileges of the affected service. The privileges gained
depend on the user account that the Host Integration Server is
configured to use during installation. The service does not require
SYSTEM privileges to run.
IV. DETECTION
iDefense has confirmed the existence of this vulnerability in Host
Integration Server 2006. Previous versions may also be affected.
V. WORKAROUND
Use the Service Control Manager to disable the SNA RPC service, and
prevent it from starting automatically. This will prevent the
vulnerable service from running, but will also prevent remote
management. Firewalling the TCP port is not a valid workaround, since
the port used for communication is dynamically assigned when the
service starts.
VI. VENDOR RESPONSE
Microsoft has officially addressed this vulnerability with Security
Bulletin MS08-059. For more information, consult their bulletin at the
following URL.
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms08-059.mspx
VII. CVE INFORMATION
The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the
name CVE-2008-3466 to this issue. This is a candidate for inclusion in
the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org/), which standardizes names for
security problems.
VIII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE
05/27/2008 Initial vendor notification.
05/27/2008 Initial vendor response.
10/14/2008 Coordinated public disclosure.
IX. CREDIT
This vulnerability was reported to iDefense by Stephen Fewer of Harmony
Security | (www.harmonysecurity.com ).
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X. LEGAL NOTICES
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