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Re: After 6 months - fix available for Microsoft DNS cache poisoning attack



rick.a.cook@xxxxxxxxx wrote:
After implementing this patch on a large scale network, it was discovered that this patch caused a dns memory leak. Microsoft has since corrected this issue with a private fix.

Amusing. They pulled the fix from being released in October at the last minute, quoting memory leaks. I guess they didn't fully address it after all...

Even worse, in my large enterprise, this patch caused the exact spoofing that 
it intended to prevent. Somehow the code to increase the entropy has caused 
random xid's to cross and spoof randomly, poisioning the cache through normal 
usage without the use of extracurricular programs. I've reported this to 
Microsoft and have been working with them in fixing this issue, which to date 
has not been fixed.

Sounds like they just draw a random number each time, regardless of the history (i.e. of previously drawn numbers), which can cause collisions (I think that's the phenomenon you describe). BIND 9 has a mechanism that ensures that collisions are discarded. OpenBSD retains history of the last 32K (IIRC) numbers used, and does not re-use those numbers. PowerDNS randomizes UDP source ports, so it considerably reduces collision likelihood. I guess MS didn't implement any such mechanism (I don't know for sure because I never reviewed their solution - I didn't get a preview version from MS).

Thanks,
-Amit