27Mhz based wireless security insecurities - Aka - "We know what you typed last summer"
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- Subject: 27Mhz based wireless security insecurities - Aka - "We know what you typed last summer"
- From: "Max Moser" <max.moser@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2007 17:27:03 +0100
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Dear Listmembers,
Today the team remote-exploit.org together with Dreamlab Technologies likes
to release another piece of uniq research work.
Although the trend in wireless communication in peripheral devices such as
keyboards and mice is moving towards Bluetooth, market leaders such as
Logitech and Microsoft rely on cost-efficient, tried-and-tested 27Mhz radio
technology.
Using just a simple radio receiver, a soundcard and suitable software, the
remote-exploit.org members Max Moser & Philipp Schroedel have managed to
tap and decode the radio frequencies transmitted between the keyboard and
PC/notebook computer.
Although manufacturers of wireless keyboards partially prevent data from being
tapped by using cryptography, unfortunately the encryption is weak and thus does
not offer real protection.
During the test, we succeeded in eavesdropping traffic from a distance
of up to
ten meters. With the appropriate technical equipment, larger distances
are possible.
For further information/whitepaper and a demonstration of the attack checkout:
http://www.remote-exploit.org or http://www.dreamlab.net.
In addition you can find the official non-technical press release from
Dreamlab Technologies at:
http://www.remote-exploit.org/Press_Release_Dreamlab_Technologies_Wireless_Keyboard.pdf
Max Moser & Philipp Schroedel
Dreamlab Technologies AG / Team remote-exploit.org