Re: VMWare poor guest isolation design
On 8/23/07, Arthur Corliss <corliss@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Wed, 22 Aug 2007, M. Burnett wrote:
>
> > I have run across a design issue in VMware's scripting automation API that
> > diminishes VM guest/host isolation in such a manner to facilitate privilege
> > escalation, spreading of malware, and compromise of guest operating systems.
> >
>
> Furthermore, this attack only works if you are running the vmware guest
> utilities *and* you are currently logged into a GUI desktop running the
> vmware userland process.
>
> In (not so) short, this attack vector is virtually worthless if reasonable
> security practices are employed.
There are other methods of compromising guests without any
requirements for API's, GUI's, etc -
http://www.mnin.org/write/2006_vmshell_injection.pdf.
--
Matt Richard