SYMSA-2007-004: Multiple Vulnerabilities in Xythos Server Products
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Symantec Vulnerability Research
http://www.symantec.com/research
Security Advisory
Advisory ID: SYMSA-2007-004
Advisory Title: Multiple Vulnerabilities in Xythos Server Products
Author: Brian Reilly / brian_reilly@xxxxxxxxxxxx
Release Date: 26-06-2007
Application: Xythos Enterprise Document Manager (XEDM) and Xythos
Digital Locker (XDL) 5.0 and 6.0\
Platform: All
Severity: Remotely exploitable / Full application control
Vendor status: Verified by vendor, patches available
CVE Number: CVE-2007-3254, CVE-2007-3255, CVE-2007-3256 [Requested]
Reference: http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/24521
Overview:
Xythos Enterprise Document Manager (XEDM) is a web-based
document management system that provides features including
document check-in, check-out, version control, workflow,
sharing, classification, retention schedules. Xythos
Enterprise Document Manager 6.0 is compliant with the U.S
Department of Defense (DoD) 5015.2-Standard (STD) for records
management systems.
XEDM is vulnerable to multiple HTML and JavaScript injection
attacks. The application fails to sanitize user input in a
number of locations, and these vulnerabilities can be leveraged
to conduct stored and reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) and
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF). Although XEDM 6.0 uses
unique action tokens to decrease the risk of CSRF, these
tokens can be obtained via XSS thereby allowing an attacker to
circumvent this countermeasure. Successful exploitation can
lead to an attacker gaining complete control of user accounts,
directories, files, and the XEDM administrative interface.
All XEDM users also have the ability to set the Content Type
of their files, and subsequently share them with other XEDM
users or external Internet users. There is no administrative
or server-side control to remove this ability from selected
users, nor is there a way for administrators to globally set
the Content Type based on file extension or actual file
contents. As a result, malicious XEDM users have an easy way
to distribute URLs from a trusted XEDM server that link to
files which may appear to be "safe," but actually contain
dangerous content.
Please note that XEDM was the only application tested by
Symantec Vulnerability Research. Based on information provided
by Xythos, Xythos Digital Locker (XDL) is also affected by
vulnerabilities #3, #4, and #5 described in this advisory
Details:
Vulnerability #1: Persistent XSS and CSRF Vulnerability in a
File Workflow Name
XEDM?s Workflow feature allows users to manage and monitor the
state of their documents with defined routing, reviews,
approvals, and notifications between multiple users. The
application performs no input validation on the name of a
saved Workflow, allowing an attacker to include HTML,
JavaScript, and other active content. Exploitation occurs
when an administrator logs into the Xythos administrative
interface and exports Workflow definitions. Attackers can
trigger arbitrary XSS and CSRF payloads, thereby gaining
complete control of the administrative interface and
performing such actions as changing server configuration
options and creating, modifying, or deleting XEDM users
Vulnerability #2: Persistent XSS Vulnerability in a File
Workflow Name
There is an additional exploitation vector for Workflow names
that contain active content. When a user deletes a Workflow
template that contains such content, the payload is triggered.
Due to likely attack scenarios, this vulnerability is less
significant than the others described in this advisory
Vulnerability #3: Persistent XSS and CSRF Vulnerability in a
File Content-Type Value
All XEDM users are able to change the Content Type of all
files in their directories to ensure they are handled by the
correct client applications. In addition to being displayed
in HTTP Response headers when downloading a file, this
information is also displayed within XEDM when users view a
file?s properties. The web form to set a file?s Content Type
uses a MAXLENGTH value in an <INPUT> tag to enforce a maximum
length of 30 characters. However, it is trivial to set
Content-Types of an arbitrary length above this limit by using
a client Web proxy, a custom browser, or an HTTP API. The
only server-side validation performed on a user-supplied
Content-Type is that it must contain a forward slash, allowing
an attacker to include HTML, JavaScript, and other active
content. Exploitation occurs when another XDEM user views the
file?s properties or "manages" the file. Attackers can
trigger arbitrary XSS and CSRF payloads, thereby gaining
complete control of the user?s account, and performing actions
including changing file permissions, and creating, modifying
and deleting files and directories
Vulnerability #4: Reflected XSS Vulnerability in the File
Upload Action
XEDM is also vulnerable to a reflected XSS vulnerability that
is exploited when the user uploads a file that contains HTML,
JavaScript, or other active content in the filename.
Successful exploitation can result in the standard XSS
payloads. Due to likely attack scenarios, this vulnerability
is less significant than the others described in this
advisory.
Vulnerability #5: Distributing Malicious Content due to
Misleading URLs and User-Supplied File Content Types
As mentioned in the details of Vulnerability #3, all XEDM
users are able to change the Content Types of all files in
their directories. While this behavior is similar to
functionality offered by other web applications and web
servers (such as the AddType directive in an Apache .htaccess
file), there is no way for an administrator to globally set
MIME types for certain file extensions or override user-set
options (such as an 'AllowOverride None' directive in an
Apache HTTP server configuration file). As a result,
malicious users have an easy way to distribute URLs from a
trusted XEDM server that link to files which may appear to be
"safe," but actually contain dangerous content. For example,
a URL of the syntax
https://some.xythos.server.tld/home/jdoe/perfectlysafe.txt and
a Content Type of application/msword could really distribute a
payload such as a zero-day Microsoft Office exploit. Other
payloads include hostile executables, HTML, JavaScript, or any
other malicious content with an arbitrary filename and the
appropriate MIME type set
Vendor Response:
Xythos has confirmed potential security vulnerabilities in
earlier versions of the 5.0 and 6.0 releases of its server
products, the Xythos WebFile Server, Xythos Digital Locker
(XDL), and Enterprise Document Manager (XEDM). We recommend
that Xythos customers upgrade to the 5.0.25.8 or 6.0.46.1
versions of these products, planned for release by the end of
June 2007.
Important note: One of the identified vulnerabilities, listed
as issue #5 in the Symantec advisory (Distributing Malicious
Content due to Misleading URLs and User-Supplied File Content
Types), is addressed only in the 6.0 release of these server
products, but not in release 5.0. Xythos considers the
resolution to this vulnerability (allowing administrators to
disallow the editing of a file's content type by end users) to
be a new feature, introduced in release 6.0 of XEDM/XDL.
We encourage Xythos customers to contact Xythos Customer Support
(support@xxxxxxxxxx) if you have questions about these security
issues, and to get the identified upgrades, when available.
Recommendation:
To address the vulnerabilities identified in this advisory,
current XEDM and XDL customers are strongly encouraged to upgrade
to version 5.0.25.8 or 6.0.46.1 (or higher) of the XEDM/XDL.
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) Information:
The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned
the following names to these issues. These are candidates for
inclusion in the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org), which standardizes
names for security problems.
CVE-2007-3254 - XSS (#1, #2, #3, #4)
CVE-2007-3255 - CSRF (#1, #3)
CVE-2007-3256 - dangerous content type specification (#5)
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