RE: Re[2]: Solaris telnet vulnberability - how many on your network?
For some commentary on this issue, this is one man's thoughts.
http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0602.html#16
Tom
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-----Original Message-----
From: Darren Reed [mailto:avalon@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]
Sent: Thursday, February 15, 2007 1:49 AM
To: Thierry@xxxxxxxxx
Cc: bugtraq@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: Re: Re[2]: Solaris telnet vulnberability - how many on your
network?
In some mail from Thierry Zoller, sie said:
>
> CDSC> real back doors are better
> I like that tautologie, "real backdoors", what makes a backdoor more
> real than another one ? Is it the coolness, the stealth ? Or is it
> simply the fact that it gives back door access ?
How about putting a backdoor into your C compiler such that it
generates "special code" when it recognises it is compiling
/bin/login that allows special access?
That doesn't show up in any code audit of /bin/login...
so you think about auditting the code that makes up the compiler..
where does the executable for that come from...
and so on back.