RE: [Full-disclosure] VML Exploit vs. AV/IPS/IDS signatures
With any luck, not too much. The point is that there is a way to do it, and
if there is a way, someone will use it in a bad manner eventually.
We can only hope that the users will count more on vulnerability/behavior
based security solutions, and not exploit based security solutions.
-- Aviv.
-----Original Message-----
From: Pukhraj Singh [mailto:pukhraj.singh@xxxxxxxxx]
Sent: Thursday, September 28, 2006 7:37 AM
To: avivra
Cc: karmic_nirvana@xxxxxxxxx; EArsal@xxxxxxxxxxx;
full-disclosure@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; bugtraq@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] VML Exploit vs. AV/IPS/IDS signatures
And you tell me how many of these variants you will actually find in
the wild. Won't be a significant number I bet.
Cheers!
Pukhraj
On 9/27/06, avivra <avivra@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> Hi,
>
> > i.e. I can't afford to buy "specialized" security tools/devices for
> > "speclialized" attacks unless my company relies heavily on web/content
> > services.
>
> So, you will buy "specialized" security tools like firewall or
> Anti-Virus, but not web content filtering tool?
>
> > In our company, we established a information-sharing
> > network with other security companies. So the real-time exploit-facing
> > signatures were then subjected to live traffic, honeypots and countless
> > variants; They seemed to work out pretty well.
>
> I would like to see how your real-time signatures get updated with the
> randomization implemented in the new VML metasploit module. Your
> "countless" exploit variants will become really innumerable.
>
> The problem is that the signatures are written for the exploit, and
> not for the vulnerability.
>
> -- Aviv.
>