The recent Oracle exploit posted to Bugtraq (http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/431353) is actually an 0day and has no patch.The referenced exploit seems to use GET_DOMAIN_INDEX_METADATA with a TYPE_NAME that references an attacker-defined package with a (modified?) ODCIIndexGetMeta function. Your last example uses GET_V2_DOMAIN_INDEX_TABLES, with arguments that reference an attacker-defined package with a (modified?) ODCIIndexUtilGetTableNames function. Is this a surface-level discrepancy, or is your vector substantively different than the one in the exploit? If these are different, then is it possible that last week's exploit was actually fixed?
No; the same problem occurs. This is the kind of general problem I'm speaking about. Most vendors that actually understand security will look for other bugs in the same functional area if you point out a bug. IMO, my job as a security vulnerability researcher is to highlight problem areas - i.e. areas of functionality that are rife with issues. How can Oracle fix one issue but miss the same flaw two lines later??? In this case though, we're not just talking about one flaw but several. Really, it is inconceivable, yet they, somehow, manage to do it.
God forbid that any of our critical national infrastructure runs on this product.... oops it does :(
And every version from 8 through 9 to 10 release 2 is vulnerable. That's every supported version of Oracle on every operating system.
Oracle customers: honestly - Oracle are not going to listen to the likes of me - but they will listen folks like you. If you're not happy with the response you're getting from Oracle then get on the 'phone - call them up and tell them that you're not happy. Please, demand improvements.
By the way, this is not an isolated incident. I have many examples to hand where Oracle have tried to fix problems in the same functional area but only whitewashed it. They should be proactively looking for similar issues in the same code just like Microsoft does.
The "champion of quality coding movement" (http://www.cio.com/archive/031505/security.html) , who "applauds ethical hacking", asks "Why isn't that standard development process?"
I don't know... but I don't think we'll find out in the two year time frame posited; we've got less than a year to go.
- Steve P.S. For those of you who are paying attention at this excruciating level of detail, it seems that David's original use of GET_DOMAIN_INDEX_METADATA in 2004 directly included the code in the NEWBLOCK argument, whereas last week's exploit was performed through an indirect reference to the code in the TYPE_NAME argument.
p.p.s. Just to clarify the issues: GET_DOMAIN_INDEX_TABLES GET_DOMAIN_INDEX_METADATA GET_V2_DOMAIN_INDEX_TABLES are all vulnerable to the exploit. Cheers, David Litchfield NGSSoftware Ltd, http://www.ngssoftware.com/ +44 (0) 208 401 0070