RE: Installation of software, and security. . .
At best the SCOTUS Grokster opinion bounces the case back to the lower
courts saying "You erred in dismissing under Betamax".
It's also pretty clear that the Supremes said "Oh, and from looking at the
facts of this case in that light, MGM will probably win".
So it's now clear that a non-infringing purpose isn't an absolute shield for
a technological device. You also have to have clean hands regarding the
usage of it.
"Thus, if you are a developer and you deploy software without giving serious
thought to the things that you could do to make the entire process of
software distribution and installation safer for everyone, then you are part
of the problem." is a HUGE stretch.
The mere fact that somebody COULD put a nasty script into SOME package? No
way... Now if you sold/gave away your Wonka-Magic-Software-Installer saying
"Oh, and BTW, Wink, Wink, if you were to add this script to your package,
you will install 27 Trojan and SpyWare apps and we'll pay you $2/copy
distributed". Well, then, you don't have clean hands...
I guess that puts me in the camp that thinks Grokster isn't a bad decision.
It might become one - after a couple more cycles through the courts make the
new rules clear.
But on it's face? No... In fact, I'd love to see the same kind of rules
applied to a couple of other industries/technologies - Guns for example (how
many Deer do you find running around the woods wearing Kevlar?). Tobacco,
Pharma and 'Nutritional' Supplements for others...
OK, back to relevant stuff...
How do we hit the middle ground - enough control over what is done so that
there is:
* At least a record of what was done.
* Some attempt at obtaining informed consent.
And, Can we do this within (or just beyond) current packaging methods?
-----Burton
-----Original Message-----
From: Jason Coombs [mailto:jasonc@xxxxxxxxxxx]
Sent: Tuesday, July 19, 2005 12:16 PM
To: Tim Nelson
Cc: John Richard Moser; Klaus Schwenk; bugtraq@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: Re: Installation of software, and security. . .
Tim Nelson wrote:
> On Sun, 17 Jul 2005, John Richard Moser wrote:
>> Yes, you hit the nail on the head with a jackhammer. One discussion
>> on autopackage was that the devs don't want to limit the API and thus
>> want the prepare, install, and uninstall to be a bash script supplied
>> by the package "so it can do anything." I hate this logic. Why does
>> it need to be able to do "anything"?
>
> I think you're both right :). I agree that packages need to be
> able to do anything, but it'd be nice if we could try to eliminate the
> pre and post install scripts.
Developers think that installers need to be able to do anything because the
developers think of themselves as being trustworthy. The code written for an
installer doesn't do anything harmful and it can be trusted, so why should
it not have the ability to do anything that the developer decides it needs
to do?
All malicious attacks originate from the hands and minds of other people,
malicious people, therefore a typical developer cannot see any harm in their
own way of thinking or in their own installer. Even those developers who
perceive an unacceptable risk or intrinsic flaw in the way that these things
get built and deployed have a very hard time seeing themselves as
responsible for the harm caused by others.
The truth is that people who expressly allow systems that are harmful to
continue to exist can be held responsible for the damage that those systems
cause, regardless of the fact that the malicious actor who initiates the
specific harm in each instance is somebody else entirely.
See: Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/04pdf/04-480.pdf
Thus, if you are a developer and you deploy software without giving serious
thought to the things that you could do to make the entire process of
software distribution and installation safer for everyone, then you are part
of the problem.
Hopefully everyone can now see that applying digital signatures to code is a
pointless exercise in somebody else's arbitrary business strategy (i.e.
VeriSign and other purveyors of so-called 'federated identity
solutions') and is not being used today as a means of achieving improved
information security. A very sad state of affairs, given that signed code at
least attempts to address these issues of security during the software
installation/distribution process, albeit today's implementations as a rule
are very poorly-conceived.
We would all receive vastly-improved installation security if every software
vendor would adopt a standard for code/data/installer authentication (that
does not require digital signatures but that could optionally use them)
based on a keyed hash algorithm and a low-cost specialized electronic device
that sits on the desktop or in the server room alongside the box to which
software is deployed and is used to verify hashes and explain forensically
what the installer intends to do to configure the box and deploy the code
and data to it.
Of course that's just the ideal improvement, which I personally believe the
industry could even train end-users to understand and use.
Particularly if the proposed device were to generate an installation key
that the user would be required to enter in order to install the software.
(Sure, greedy people would try to use this to increase license revenue or
improve controls over intellectual property and copyright; they will just
have to be fought back by those who understand that the point is security
not personal enrichment.)
Short of the ideal stand-alone embedded system this concept could also be
built as software-only. Does anyone care? Will anyone ever build it?
Regards,
Jason Coombs
jasonc@xxxxxxxxxxx