[ZH2005-16SA] Insecure temporary file creation in Skype for Linux
[ZH2005-16SA] Insecure temporary file creation in Skype for Linux
Application: Skype for Linux
Version affected: <= 1.1.0.20
Vendor website : http://www.skype.com
Author: Giovanni Delvecchio
e-mail: badpenguin at zone-h.org
About Skype
==========
Skype is a free program that uses the latest P2P technology to bring affordable
and high-quality voice communications to people all over the
world. It also provides a service of Instant Messaging.
Details
======
Each user has his own profile which can be personalized with a picture. When a
user adds a picture for his profile, Skype creates in /tmp directory a file
named "skype_profile.jpg" in an insecure manner, without checking if the file
already exists and if it's a symbolic link.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bad@badpenguin:~/skype-1.1.0.20$ strace -e trace=open skype
.
.
open("/home/bad/image.jpg", O_RDONLY|O_LARGEFILE) = 21 // picture chosen by user
open("/tmp/skype_profile.jpg", O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC|O_LARGEFILE, 0666) = 23
// insecure temporary file creation (it should use O_EXCL or O_NOFOLLOW flag)
.
.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This could represent a security problem in a multi-user environment because
usually /tmp directory is "world-writable".
Indeed, such problem could be exploited by a malicious local user via symlink
attack to overwrite arbitrary files with the privileges of the user that
running Skype.
Example:
ln -s file_to_overwrite /tmp/skype_profile.jpg
When the user will add a picture for his profile , the file symlinked by
attacker will be overwritten with the file content that the user has chosen
to update his profile.
In certain conditions a privilege escalation is possible.
An example of privilege escalation exploiting this type of vulnerability is the
following:
from http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/82/327361/2003-06-29/2003-07-05/0 :
"Starting release 9, Red Hat ships and uses pam_timestamp_check.so module
(accompanied by /sbin/pam_timestamp_check setuid helper), a part of the new
pam-0.75 (Pluggable Authentication Modules) package. PAM is a generic
centralized authentication and session management component that is also
shipped by an increasing number of other distributions, so it is reasonable
that the code is about to propagate to other distros.
The module mentioned implements a credential caching functionality, very
closely inspired on a tty ticketing system used in sudo.
The way the module works(and sudo), in essence, is that it gets current
pseudo-terminal name A, current user name B, and the user for which
credentials are cached, C (usually root for Red Hat applications, user himself
for sudo). Then the code checks for /var/run/sudo/B/A:C (or
/var/run/sudo/B/A if B == C), and if the file is recent (regardless of its
content), the module returns success, and enables the user to skip the usual
password authentication.
Since there's no check for file origin, it should be more than obvious that
suddenly, any insecure file creation problem in an application used by a
superuser,it is possible to spoof a ticket in /var/run and bypass root password
prompt and other checks, and perform administrative tasks, easily
modifying system config, installing custom components (say, a rootshell), etc.
All this by
crafting a single symlink that is later opened with O_CREAT with no O_EXCL or
O_NOFOLLOW.
Example:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#!/bin/sh
#get current terminal number from /dev/pts/xx
terminal_number=`tty | cut -f4 -d '/'`
user_ticket=$USER/$terminal_number:root
ln -s /var/run/sudo/$user_ticket /tmp/skype_profile.jpg
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Solution
========
No fix available at the moment;
Grant only trusted users writing access to /tmp directory .
Timeline
========
07 April 2005 - bug dicovered
08 April 2005 - Skype contacted by security at skype.net
14 April 2005 - 1th Response from Skype:
"Thank you for the email, we will pass it on to our developers.
Regards,
Andres"
25 May 2005 - Skype for Linux version 1.1.0.13 released, the problem is present
again.
27 May 2005 - Skype re-contacted by security at skype.net
27 May 2005 - 2th Response from Skype:
"Giovanni, Thank you for the email again. I've spoken to our Linux developers
and they assure me this will be fixed in the next version and
they are considering posting an immediate advisory.
Again, your help is appreciated.
Regards,
Andres"
5 July 2005 - Skype for Linux version 1.1.0.20 released, but the bug hasn't
been fixed.
15 July 205 - Public advisory
Author's Note
=============
Although this type of vulnerability isn't a problem for a single desktop user,
instead it could represent a problem in a multi user environment.
For example, Skype is used by many companies with some hundred of employees,
and in such environment several users have access on an host, locally or
remotely . Any user,even with low privileges, could exploit this type
vulnerabily to overwrite or create arbitrary files with the privileges of
the user that running Skype, and in certain case conduct a privilege escalation.
A study made by CERT (Computer Emergency Response Team) called ITS (Insider
Thread Study) shows like many times the incidents in companies are pepetrated
by insider (eg. current or former employees ).
So, i think that in these conditions this bug may represent a security problem
, and Skype should fix it quickly.
Reference
=========
http://www.zone-h.org/advisories/read/id=7808