[OpenPKG-SA-2005.010] OpenPKG Security Advisory (openpkg)
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OpenPKG Security Advisory The OpenPKG Project
http://www.openpkg.org/security.html http://www.openpkg.org
openpkg-security@xxxxxxxxxxx openpkg@xxxxxxxxxxx
OpenPKG-SA-2005.010 10-Jun-2005
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Package: openpkg
Vulnerability: arbitrary file mode modification,
arbitrary path writing,
denial of service
OpenPKG Specific: no
Affected Releases: Affected Packages: Corrected Packages:
OpenPKG CURRENT <= openpkg-20050609-20050609 >= openpkg-20050610-20050610
OpenPKG 2.3 <= openpkg-2.2.2-2.2.2 >= openpkg-2.2.3-2.2.3
OpenPKG 2.2 <= openpkg-2.3.1-2.3.1 >= openpkg-2.3.2-2.3.2
Dependent Packages: none
Description:
The vulnerabilities described by this text affect the OpenPKG
bootstrap package's GZip and BZip2 embedded software. Similar
advisories [0][1] describe the same vulnerabilities, although in
context of the particular vendor software.
According to a Debian bug report [2], Ulf Harnhammar discovered an
input validation error in the GZip data compressor [3]. Because
gzip(1) fails to properly validate file paths during decompression
with the "-N" argument, a remote attacker using a malicious archive
could corrupt arbitrary files with the privileges of the user that
is running gzip(1). The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)
project assigned the identifier CAN-2005-1228 [4] to this problem.
According to a BugTraq posting [5], Imran Ghory discovered a time
of check time of use (TOCTOU) file mode vulnerability in the BZip2
data compressor [6]. Because bzip2(1) does not safely restore the
mode of a file undergoing compression or decompression, a malicious
user can potentially change the mode of any file belonging to the
user running bzip2(1). The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)
project assigned the identifier CAN-2005-0953 [7] to this problem.
In a unrelated BZip2 problem, a denial of service vulnerability
was found in both the bzip2(1) program and its associated library
libbz2(3). Specially crafted BZip2 archives lead to an infinite loop
in the decompressor which results in an indefinitively large output
file. This could be exploited to cause disk space exhaustion. The
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project assigned the
identifier CAN-2005-1260 [8] to this problem.
Please check whether you are affected by running "<prefix>/bin/openpkg
rpm -q openpkg". If the openpkg package version is affected (see
above), we recommend that you immediately upgrade it (see Solution)
[9][10].
Solution:
Select the updated source RPM appropriate for your OpenPKG release
[11][12], fetch it from the OpenPKG FTP service [13][14] or a mirror
location, verify its integrity [15], build a corresponding binary
RPM from it [9] and update your OpenPKG installation by applying the
binary RPM [10]. For the most recent release OpenPKG 2.3, perform the
following operations to permanently fix the security problem (for
other releases adjust accordingly).
$ ftp ftp.openpkg.org
ftp> bin
ftp> cd release/2.3/UPD
ftp> get openpkg-2.3.2-2.3.2.src.rpm
ftp> bye
$ <prefix>/bin/openpkg rpm -v --checksig openpkg-2.3.2-2.3.2.src.rpm
$ <prefix>/bin/openpkg rpm --rebuild openpkg-2.3.2-2.3.2.src.rpm
$ su -
# <prefix>/bin/openpkg rpm -Fvh <prefix>/RPM/PKG/openpkg-2.3.2-2.3.2.*.rpm
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References:
[0] http://www.openpkg.org/security/OpenPKG-SA-2005.008-bzip2.html
[1] http://www.openpkg.org/security/OpenPKG-SA-2005.009-gzip.html
[2] http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=305255
[3] http://www.gzip.org/
[4] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-1228
[5] http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=bugtraq&m=111229375217633
[6] http://sources.redhat.com/bzip2/
[7] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-0953
[8] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-1260
[9] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-source
[10] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-binary
[11] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.3/UPD/openpkg-2.3.2-2.3.2.src.rpm
[12] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.2/UPD/openpkg-2.2.3-2.2.3.src.rpm
[13] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.3/UPD/
[14] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.2/UPD/
[15] http://www.openpkg.org/security.html#signature
________________________________________________________________________
For security reasons, this advisory was digitally signed with the
OpenPGP public key "OpenPKG <openpkg@xxxxxxxxxxx>" (ID 63C4CB9F) of the
OpenPKG project which you can retrieve from http://pgp.openpkg.org and
hkp://pgp.openpkg.org. Follow the instructions on http://pgp.openpkg.org/
for details on how to verify the integrity of this advisory.
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