Re: [HACKERS] Postgres: pg_hba.conf, md5, pg_shadow, encrypted
Am Donnerstag, den 21.04.2005, 09:32 -0400 schrieb Rod Taylor:
> On Thu, 2005-04-21 at 11:06 +0200, Tino Wildenhain wrote:
> > Am Mittwoch, den 20.04.2005, 16:23 -0500 schrieb Jim C. Nasby:
> > > On Wed, Apr 20, 2005 at 05:03:18PM -0400, Tom Lane wrote:
> > ...
> > > Simply put, MD5 is no longer strong enough for protecting secrets. It's
> > > just too easy to brute-force. SHA1 is ok for now, but it's days are
> > > numbered as well. I think it would be good to alter SHA1 (or something
> > > stronger) as an alternative to MD5, and I see no reason not to use a
> > > random salt instead of username.
> >
> > I wonder where you want to store that random salt and how this would add
> > to the security.
>
> One advantage of a random salt would be that the username can be changed
> without having to reset the password at the same time.
Still this does not answer the question where that salt is to be
stored :)
(instead of username one could use somefacyhash(userid) to be
independend from username - otoh, if you change usernames
you usually face some other serious problems like object
ownership and friends)
--
Tino Wildenhain <tino@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- References:
- Postgres: pg_hba.conf, md5, pg_shadow, encrypted passwords
- Re: [HACKERS] Postgres: pg_hba.conf, md5, pg_shadow, encrypted passwords
- Re: [HACKERS] Postgres: pg_hba.conf, md5, pg_shadow, encrypted passwords
- Re: [HACKERS] Postgres: pg_hba.conf, md5, pg_shadow, encrypted passwords
- Re: [HACKERS] Postgres: pg_hba.conf, md5, pg_shadow, encrypted