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[waraxe-2005-SA#042] - Multiple vulnerabilities in Coppermine Photo Gallery 1.3.2

{                              [waraxe-2005-SA#042]                             
{          [ Multiple vulnerabilities in Coppermine Photo Gallery 1.3.2 ]       
Author: Janek Vind "waraxe"
Date: 20. April 2005
Location: Estonia, Tartu
Web: http://www.waraxe.us/advisory-42.html

Target software description:

Coppermine Photo Gallery 

Coppermine is an easily set-up, fast, feature-rich photo gallery script with 
database. CPG supports template & user management, private galleries, automatic
thumbnail creation, film strip, e-card feature for easy customization to match 
rest of a site. CPG 1.3 adds multiple uploads, updated securities, countless 
many new features including support for document types (ie tiff, psd, swf etc) 
online editing of documents! 

Homepage: http://coppermine.sourceforge.net/


Today we will analyze some possible security flaws in Coppermine 1.3.2 
It all will start from:

A - Sql injection

Here is code fragment from "/include/init.inc.php" line ~ 357:

--------[original source code]--------
// See if the fav cookie is set else set it
if (isset($HTTP_COOKIE_VARS[$CONFIG['cookie_name'] . '_fav'])) {
    $FAVPICS = 
@unserialize(@base64_decode($HTTP_COOKIE_VARS[$CONFIG['cookie_name'] . 
} else {
    $FAVPICS = array();
--------[/original source code]--------

So as we can see, data from cookie (typical is "cpg132_fav") is base64_decode-d 
and then unserialized.
So ANY kind of data can be delivered to coppermine, including single quotes (" 
' "), nulls ("\0"), etc.
What next? As i can understand, $FAVPICS is supposed to be as array with INT 
But where is checks then? With unserialize() there are all things possible...

Let's see further, file "include/functions.inc.php", line ~ 840:

--------[original source code]--------
if (count($FAVPICS)>0){
        $favs = implode(",",$FAVPICS);
        $result = db_query("SELECT COUNT(*) from {$CONFIG['TABLE_PICTURES']} 
WHERE approved = 'YES' AND pid IN ($favs)");
        $nbEnr = mysql_fetch_array($result);
        $count = $nbEnr[0];

        $select_columns = '*';

        $result = db_query("SELECT $select_columns FROM 
{$CONFIG['TABLE_PICTURES']} WHERE approved = 'YES'AND pid IN ($favs) $limit");
        $rowset = db_fetch_rowset($result);


        if ($set_caption) foreach ($rowset as $key => $row){
                $caption = $rowset[$key]['title'] ? "<span 
class=\"thumb_caption\">".($rowset[$key]['title'])."</span>" : '';
                $rowset[$key]['caption_text'] = $caption;
--------[/original source code]--------

Well, "$favs" uses "$FAVPICS" without any sanitize and possible single quotes 
can propagate to $favs too.
And finally "$favs" is used directly in sql queries. Therefore sql injection 
can take place and it's exploitable.
Good news (for admin's and webmasters) is, that this kind of sql injection case 
is complicated to implement,
because specific restricting factors. It needs to write special script or 
program, which uses COOKIE variables and
some blind sql injection technics. Not for scriptkiddies this time ...

Now, let's move further and assume, that someone is exploiting this specific 
sql injection and can therefore retrieve
from database any arbitrary information. As usual, most interesting data do 
steal is admin username and password hash.
So we are arrived to:

B - Plaintext passwords in database

Believe it or not, Coppermine uses plaintext passwords for storing in sql 
database. No md5, no sha1, just plaintext...
I have information, that Coppermine will be using md5 hashes soon, but right 
now attacker can retrieve from
sql database admin username and password and then get easily administrator 
privileges in Coppermine context.
This gives to attacker new possibilities to further assault, and one of them is:

C - Sql injection in "zipdownload.php"
Let's look at source code from "zipdownload.php" line ~ 45:

--------[original source code]--------
if (count($FAVPICS)>0){
        $favs = implode(",",$FAVPICS);

        $select_columns = 'filepath,filename';

        $result = db_query("SELECT $select_columns FROM 
{$CONFIG['TABLE_PICTURES']} WHERE approved = 'YES'AND pid IN ($favs)");
        $rowset = db_fetch_rowset($result);
        foreach ($rowset as $key => $row){

                $filelist[] = 

--------[/original source code]--------

Zipdownload functionality is disabled by default in Coppermine, but when 
attacker will have admin
privileges, it can be turned on. And by looking to source code we can see, that 
it will give to
potential intruder possibilites to download any file from server, readable by 

How to fix:

Vendor first contacted: 16. April 2005
Vendor first response: 17. April 2005
Details sent to vendor: 17. April 2005
Vendor second response: 17. April 2005 

Patch released by vendor: 20. April 2005
URL: http://coppermine.sourceforge.net/board/index.php?topic=17134

New Coppermine version 1.3.3 is available at:


Discussions -  http://www.waraxe.us/forums.html

Additional resources:

Online Base64 decoder and encoder - http://base64-encoder-online.waraxe.us/

SiteMapper - free php script for SEO phpNuke powered websites -
Fresh version 0.5 can be downloaded @ http://sitemapper.waraxe.us/


Greets to LINUX, Heintz, murdock, g0df4th3r, slimjim100, shai-tan, y3dips and
all other active members from waraxe.us forum !

Tervitused - Raido Kerna !


    Janek Vind "waraxe"

    Homepage: http://www.waraxe.us/

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