[OpenPKG-SA-2004.051] OpenPKG Security Advisory (imapd)
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OpenPKG Security Advisory The OpenPKG Project
http://www.openpkg.org/security.html http://www.openpkg.org
openpkg-security@xxxxxxxxxxx openpkg@xxxxxxxxxxx
OpenPKG-SA-2004.051 29-Nov-2004
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Package: imapd
Vulnerability: arbitrary code execution
OpenPKG Specific: no
Affected Releases: Affected Packages: Corrected Packages:
OpenPKG CURRENT <= imapd-2.2.9-20041123 >= imapd-2.2.10-20041124
OpenPKG 2.2 <= imapd-2.2.8-2.2.0 >= imapd-2.2.8-2.2.1
OpenPKG 2.1 <= imapd-2.2.6-2.1.0 >= imapd-2.2.6-2.1.1
Affected Releases: Dependent Packages: none
Description:
According to a security advisory from Stefan Esser [0], several
vulnerabilities exist in Cyrus imapd. The updated OpenPKG packages fix
all these problems.
When the option "IMAPMAGICPLUS" is activated on a server, the
"PROXY" and "LOGIN" commands suffer a standard stack overflow,
because the username is not checked against a maximum length. The
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project assigned the id
CAN-2004-1011 [2] to the problem.
Due to a bug within the argument parser of the "PARTIAL" command
buffer positions outside the allocated memory buffer may be accessed.
The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project assigned the id
CAN-2004-1012 [3] to the problem.
The argument parser of the "FETCH" command suffers a similar bug. The
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project assigned the id
CAN-2004-1013 [4] to the problem.
Under memory allocation failure conditions the "cmd_append" handler
supporting "MULTIAPPENDS" may enter code paths doing post increments
whose behavior is undefined in ANSI C. The same function also suffers
from a integer wrap. No CVE id.
Another "IMAPMAGICPLUS" overflow was later discovered by Thomas
Klaeger in proxyd.c "proxyd_canon_user" function. The Common
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project assigned the id
CAN-2004-1015 [5] to the problem.
Sebastian Krahmer mentioned a missing NUL-termination in global.c and
provided a patch. No CVE id.
Please check whether you are affected by running "<prefix>/bin/openpkg
rpm -q imapd". If you have the "imapd" package installed and its
version is affected (see above), we recommend that you immediately
upgrade it [6][7].
Solution:
Select the updated source RPM appropriate for your OpenPKG release
[8][9], fetch it from the OpenPKG FTP service [10][11] or a mirror
location, verify its integrity [12], build a corresponding binary RPM
from it [6] and update your OpenPKG installation by applying the
binary RPM [7]. For the most recent release OpenPKG 2.2, perform the
following operations to permanently fix the security problem (for
other releases adjust accordingly).
$ ftp ftp.openpkg.org
ftp> bin
ftp> cd release/2.2/UPD
ftp> get imapd-2.2.8-2.2.1.src.rpm
ftp> bye
$ <prefix>/bin/openpkg rpm -v --checksig imapd-2.2.8-2.2.1.src.rpm
$ <prefix>/bin/openpkg rpm --rebuild imapd-2.2.8-2.2.1.src.rpm
$ su -
# <prefix>/bin/openpkg rpm -Fvh <prefix>/RPM/PKG/imapd-2.2.8-2.2.1.*.rpm
Additionally, we recommend that you rebuild and reinstall
all dependent packages (see above), if any, too [6][7].
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References:
[0] http://security.e-matters.de/advisories/152004.html
[1] http://asg.web.cmu.edu/cyrus/imapd/
[2] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-1011
[3] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-1012
[4] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-1013
[5] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-1015
[6] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-source
[7] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-binary
[8] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.2/UPD/imapd-2.2.8-2.2.1.src.rpm
[9] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.1/UPD/imapd-2.2.6-2.1.1.src.rpm
[10] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.2/UPD/
[11] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.1/UPD/
[12] http://www.openpkg.org/security.html#signature
________________________________________________________________________
For security reasons, this advisory was digitally signed with the
OpenPGP public key "OpenPKG <openpkg@xxxxxxxxxxx>" (ID 63C4CB9F) of the
OpenPKG project which you can retrieve from http://pgp.openpkg.org and
hkp://pgp.openpkg.org. Follow the instructions on http://pgp.openpkg.org/
for details on how to verify the integrity of this advisory.
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