Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco IOS DHCP Blocked Interface Denial-of-Service
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Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco IOS DHCP Blocked Interface Denial-of-Service
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Revision 1.0
For Public Release 2004 November 10 1700 UTC (GMT)
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Contents
Summary
Affected Products
Details
Impact
Software Versions and Fixes
Obtaining Fixed Software
Workarounds
Exploitation and Public Announcements
Status of This Notice: FINAL
Distribution
Revision History
Cisco Security Procedures
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Summary
=======
Cisco IOS devices running branches of Cisco IOS version 12.2S that have
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) server or relay agent enabled, even
if not configured, are vulnerable to a denial of service where the input queue
becomes blocked when receiving specifically crafted DHCP packets. Cisco is
providing free fixed software to address this issue. There are also workarounds
to mitigate this vulnerability. This issue was introduced by the fix included
in CSCdx46180 and is being tracked by Cisco Bug ID CSCee50294 ( registered
customers only) .
This advisory is available at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20041110-dhcp.shtml.
Affected Products
=================
This vulnerability was introduced by the fix for CSCdx46180, and was integrated
in Cisco IOS 12.2(14)SZ and 12.2(18)S.
The following Cisco products running Cisco IOS version 12.2(14)SZ, or a variant
of Cisco IOS 12.2(18)S (as listed in the following section) and higher are
affected by this vulnerability.
* Cisco 7200, 7300, 7500 platforms
* Cisco 2650, 2651, 2650XM, 2651XM Multiservice platform
* Cisco ONS15530, ONS15540
* Cisco Catalyst 4000, Sup2plus, Sup3, Sup4 and Sup5 modules
* Cisco Catalyst 4500, Sup2Plus TS
* Cisco Catalyst 4948, 2970, 3560, and 3750
* Cisco Catalyst 6000, Sup2/MSFC2 and Sup720/MSFC3
* Cisco 7600 Sup2/MSFC2 and Sup720/MSFC3
Vulnerable Products
- -------------------
This issue affects only Cisco devices running affected Cisco IOS versions 12.2
(18)EW, 12.2(18)EWA, 12.2(14)SZ, 12.2(18)S, 12.2(18)SE, 12.2(18)SV, 12.2(18)SW
and higher that do not have the configuration command no service dhcp. It is
not necessary for DHCP server or relay agent to be configured in order for this
vulnerability to be present and exploited; "service dhcp" is enabled by default
in IOS and is the only setting necessary (in addition to interface addresses)
for exploitation of this vulnerability. This includes routers as well as
switches and line cards which run Cisco IOS software. Cisco devices which do
not run Cisco IOS software are not affected. Cisco devices running affected
Cisco IOS software with the command no service dhcp enabled are not affected.
To determine the software running on a Cisco product, log in to the device and
issue the show version command to display the system banner. Cisco IOS software
will identify itself as "Internetwork Operating System Software" or simply
"IOS." On the next line of output, the image name will be displayed between
parentheses, followed by "Version" and the IOS release name. Other Cisco
devices will not have the show version command or will give different output.
The following example identifies a Cisco product running IOS release 12.0(3)
with an installed image name of C2500-IS-L:
Cisco Internetwork Operating System Software IOS (TM)
2500 Software (C2500-IS-L), Version 12.0(3), RELEASE SOFTWARE
The release train label is "12.0."
The next example shows a product running Cisco IOS release 12.0(2a)T1 with an
image name of C2600-JS-MZ:
Cisco Internetwork Operating System Software IOS (tm)
C2600 Software (C2600-JS-MZ), Version 12.0(2a)T1, RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc1)
Additional information about Cisco IOS release naming can be found at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/620/1.html.
Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
- ---------------------------------
Cisco devices running affected Cisco IOS software with the command no service
dhcp enabled are not affected.
Cisco products that run any versions of IOS not listed in the Software Versions
and Fixes table below, are not affected.
Cisco products that do not run Cisco IOS software and are not affected by this
vulnerability include, but are not limited to:
* 700 series dialup routers (750, 760, and 770 series) are not affected.
* WAN switching products such as the IGX, BPX and MGX lines are not affected.
* No host-based software is affected.
* The Cisco PIX Firewall is not affected
* The Cisco LocalDirector is not affected.
* The Cisco Content Engine and ACNS is not affected.
* The Catalyst 2901/2902, 2948G, 2980G, 4000, 5000, and 6000 switches running
CatOS.
* Cisco Network Registrar is not affected.
* Cisco VPN 3000 series is not affected
* Cisco IOS-XR platform is not affected.
* Cisco MDS 9000 family is not affected.
Details
=======
DHCP services allow devices to request and receive basic host configuration
information from the DHCP server via the network. Cisco routers can be
configured to both provide dynamic host configuration information (termed DHCP
server function), and forward DHCP and BootP packets across separate broadcast
domains (termed DHCP relay agent function). Cisco routers are configured to
process and accept DHCP packets by default, therefore the command "service
dhcp"
does not appear in the running configuration display, and only the command for
the disabled feature, no service dhcp, will appear in the running configuration
display when the feature is disabled. The vulnerability is present, regardless
if the DHCP server or relay agent configurations are present on an affected
product. The only required configuration for this vulnerability in affected
versions is the lack of the no service dhcp command. Certain crafted DHCP
packets may be undeliverable, but will remain in the queue instead of being
dropped. If a number of packets are sent that equal the size of the input
queue, no more traffic will be accepted on that interface.
On a blocked Ethernet interface, Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) times out
after a default time of four hours, and no inbound or outbound traffic can be
processed, including both IP and non-IP traffic such as IPX. The device must be
rebooted to clear the input queue on the interface, and will not reload without
user intervention. The attack may be repeated on all interfaces, causing the
router to be remotely inaccessible, excluding the console port where DHCP
packets are not processed by default and which can be used for out-of-band
management and configured for remote access. Workarounds are available, and are
documented in the Workarounds section below. Other types of interfaces,
including but not limited to ATM, Serial and POS interfaces, are affected, but
ARP is not a factor.
To identify a blocked input interface, use the show interfaces command and look
for the Input Queue line. The size of the input queue may keep increasing. If
the current size (in this case, 76) is larger than the maximum size (75), the
input queue is blocked.
Router#show interface ethernet 0/0
Ethernet0/0 is up, line protocol is up
Hardware is AmdP2, address is 0050.500e.f1e0 (bia 0050.500e.f1e0)
Internet address is 172.16.1.9/24
MTU 1500 bytes, BW 10000 Kbit, DLY 1000 usec, rely 255/255, load 1/255
Encapsulation ARPA, loopback not set, keepalive set (10 sec)
ARP type: ARPA, ARP Timeout 04:00:00
Last input 00:00:41, output 00:00:07, output hang never
Last clearing of "show interface" counters 00:07:18
Input queue: 76/75/1091/0 (size/max/drops/flushes); Total output drops: 0
!--- The 76/75 shows that this is blocked
Impact
======
A device receiving these specifically crafted DHCP packets will force the
inbound interface to stop processing traffic. The device may stop processing
packets destined to the router, including routing protocol packets and ARP
packets. No alarms will be triggered, nor will the router reload to correct
itself. This vulnerability may be exercised repeatedly resulting in loss of
availability until a workaround has been applied or the device has been
upgraded to a fixed version of code.
The effects of this vulnerability can be monitored by the same methods outlined
in the white paper entitled Uses of Network Management for Monitoring the "IP
Packet Blocks Input Queue" PSIRT Advisory which details methods to identify
impacted devices via SNMP, RMON, and Network Management products.
Software Versions and Fixes
===========================
Each row of the Cisco IOS software table below describes a release train and
the platforms or products for which it is intended. If a given release train is
vulnerable, then the earliest possible releases that contain the fix (the
"First Fixed Release") and the anticipated date of availability for each are
listed in the "Rebuild" and "Maintenance" columns. A device running a release
in the given train that is earlier than the release in a specific column (less
than the First Fixed Release) is known to be vulnerable. The release should be
upgraded at least to the indicated release or a later version (greater than or
equal to the First Fixed Release label). When selecting a release, keep in mind
the following definitions:
* Maintenance: Most heavily tested, stable, and highly recommended release of
a release train in any given row of the table.
* Rebuild: Constructed from the previous maintenance or major release in the
same train, it contains the fix for a specific defect. Although it receives
less testing, it contains only the minimal changes necessary to repair the
vulnerability.
In all cases, customers should exercise caution to confirm that the devices to
be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software
configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new software
release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco TAC for assistance
as shown in the Obtaining Fixed Software section below.
More information on Cisco IOS software release names and abbreviations is
available at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/620/1.html.
The fixes will be available at the Software Center located at
http://www.cisco.com/tacpage/sw-center/.
For software installation and upgrade procedures, see
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/130/upgrade_index.shtml.
For a current view of all posted and repaired images for Cisco IOS, please
check the listing available to registered Cisco.com users at:
http://www.cisco.com/tacpage/sw-center/sw-ios.shtml.
+---------------------------------------------+
| Major Release | Availability of Repaired |
| | Releases |
|----------------+----------------------------|
| Affected | | |
| 12.2-Based | Rebuild | Maintenance |
| Release | | |
|----------------+--------------+-------------|
| 12.2(18)EW | 12.2(18)EW2 | |
|----------------+--------------+-------------|
| 12.2(18)EWA | | 12.2(20)EWA |
|----------------+--------------+-------------|
| | 12.2(18)S6 | |
| |--------------+-------------|
| | 12.2(20)S4 | |
|12.2(18)S |--------------+-------------|
| | 12.2(22)S2 | |
| |--------------+-------------|
| | | 12.2(25)S |
|----------------+--------------+-------------|
| 12.2(18)SE | 12.2(20)SE3 | |
|----------------+--------------+-------------|
| 12.2(18)SV | | 12.2(24)SV |
|----------------+--------------+-------------|
| 12.2(18)SW | | 12.2(25)SW |
|----------------+----------------------------|
| 12.2(18)SXD | Not impacted |
|----------------+----------------------------|
| 12.2(14)SZ | Migrates to | |
| | 12.2(20)S4 | |
+---------------------------------------------+
Obtaining Fixed Software
========================
Customers with Service Contracts
- --------------------------------
Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular
update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be
obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://
www.cisco.com.
Customers using Third-party Support Organizations
- -------------------------------------------------
Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or
existing agreement with third-party support organizations such as Cisco
Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that
support organization for assistance with the upgrade, which should be free of
charge.
Customers without Service Contracts
- -----------------------------------
Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but who do not hold a Cisco service
contract and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are
unsuccessful at obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should get
their upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC
contacts are as follows.
* +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
* +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
* e-mail: tac@xxxxxxxxx
Please have your product serial number available and give the URL of this
notice as evidence of your entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for
non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC.
Please do not contact either "psirt@xxxxxxxxx" or "security-alert@xxxxxxxxx"
for software upgrades.
See http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml for additional
TAC contact information, including special localized telephone numbers and
instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages.
Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have
purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such
software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software
license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-license-agreement.html,
or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml.
Workarounds
===========
There are four possible workarounds for this vulnerability:
* Disabling the dhcp service
* Control Plane Policing
* Two versions of Access Control Lists
Disabling the DHCP Service
- --------------------------
This vulnerability can be mitigated by utilizing the command:
no service dhcp
However, this workaround will disable all DHCP processing on the device,
including the DHCP helper functionality that may be necessary in some network
configurations.
Control Plane Policing Feature
- ------------------------------
The Control Plane Policy feature may be used to mitigate this vulnerability, as
in the following example:
access-list 140 deny udp host 192.168.13.1 any eq bootps
access-list 140 deny udp any host 192.168.13.1 eq bootps
access-list 140 deny udp any host 255.255.255.255 eq bootps
access-list 140 permit udp any any eq bootps
class-map match-all bootps-class
match access-group 140
policy-map control-plane-policy
class bootps-class
police 8000 1500 1500 conform-action drop exceed-action drop
control-plane
service-policy input control-plane-policy
For this example 192.168.13.1 is a legitimate DHCP server.
Additional information on the configuration and use of the CPP feature can be
found at this link:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/partner/products/sw/iosswrel/ps1838/
products_feature_guide09186a00801afad4.html.
This workaround is only applicable to Cisco IOS 12.2S, as this feature is only
available in Cisco IOS versions 12.2S and 12.3T. Cisco IOS 12.3T is not
impacted by this advisory.
Access Lists - Two Methods
- --------------------------
Access lists can be applied to block DHCP/BootP traffic destined to any router
interface addresses, as in the following example:
In this example, the IP address 192.168.13.1 represents a legitimate DHCP
server, the addresses 10.89.236.147 and 192.168.13.2 represent router interface
addresses, and 192.168.61.1 represents a loopback interface on the router.
In this example, any bootp/dhcp packets destined to the router interface
addresses are blocked.
access-list 100 remark permit bootps from the DHCP server
access-list 100 permit udp host 192.168.13.1 any eq bootps
access-list 100 remark deny bootps from any to router f1/0
access-list 100 deny udp any host 10.89.236.147 eq bootps
access-list 100 remark deny bootps from any to router f0/0
access-list 100 deny udp any host 192.168.13.2 eq bootps
access-list 100 remark deny bootps from any to router loopback1
access-list 100 deny udp any host 192.168.61.1 eq bootps
access-list 100 remark permit all other traffic
access-list 100 permit ip any any
access-list 100 is applied to f0/0 and f1/0 physical interfaces.
interface FastEthernet0/0
ip address 192.168.13.2 255.255.255.0
ip access-group 100 in
interface FastEthernet1/0
ip address 10.89.236.147 255.255.255.240
ip access-group 100 in
ip helper-address 192.168.13.1
An alternate configuration for the interface access-list workaround.
This example would also need to be applied to all physical interfaces, but deny
statements for all of the IP addresses configured on the router are not
necessary in this approach. In this example, the address 192.168.13.1
represents a legitimate DHCP server.
access-list 100 permit udp host 192.168.13.1 any eq bootps
access-list 100 permit udp any host 192.168.13.1 eq bootps
access-list 100 permit udp any host 255.255.255.255 eq bootps
access-list 100 deny udp any any eq bootps
interface FastEthernet0/0
ip address 192.168.13.2 255.255.255.0
ip access-group 100 in
interface FastEthernet1/0
ip address 10.89.236.147 255.255.255.240
ip access-group 100 in
ip helper-address 192.168.13.1
Note: These workarounds will not prevent spoofed IP packets with the source IP
address set to that of the DHCP server
For more information on anti-spoofing refer to http://www.cisco.com/en/US/tech/
tk648/tk361/technologies_tech_note09186a0080120f 48.shtml#sec_ip and
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2827.txt.
The Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (Unicast RPF) feature helps to mitigate
problems that are caused by spoofed IP source addresses. For further details,
please refer to http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/product/software/ios122
/122cgcr/fsecur_c/fothersf/scfrpf.htm.
Exploitation and Public Announcements
=====================================
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of
the vulnerability described in this advisory. This vulnerability was reported
to Cisco by a customer.
Status of This Notice: FINAL
============================
THIS ADVISORY IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF
GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE ADVISORY OR MATERIALS
LINKED FROM THE ADVISORY IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO
CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS NOTICE AT ANY TIME.
Distribution
This advisory will be posted on Cisco's worldwide website at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20041110-dhcp.shtml.
In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is
clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail
and Usenet news recipients.
* cust-security-announce@xxxxxxxxx
* first-teams@xxxxxxxxx (includes CERT/CC)
* bugtraq@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
* vulnwatch@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
* cisco@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
* cisco-nsp@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
* full-disclosure@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
* comp.dcom.sys.cisco@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide
website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or
newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the
above URL for any updates.
Revision History
+---------------------------------------------+
| Revision | | Initial |
| 1.0 | 2004-November-10 | public |
| | | release. |
+---------------------------------------------+
Cisco Security Procedures
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products,
obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive
security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html.
This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security
notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.
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