pressinfo@xxxxxxxxxxx wrote:
<>In-Reply-To: <20040831203815.13871.qmail@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>In addition to the facts stated above, a paper and an electronic record of all cast ballots are retrieved from each individual voting machine following an election. The results from each individual machine are then tabulated, and thoroughly audited during the standard election canvass process. Once the audit is complete, the official winners are announced. Any alleged changes to a vote count in the election management software would be immediately discovered during this audit process, as this total would not match the true official total tabulated from each machine.
Something with a legitimate purpose may not always be used in a legitimate fashion. If "legitimate" features exist which could pervert the primary purpose of the system -- to accurately record and collate votes -- and those features could forseeably be used in such a way with the collusion of only a small number of individuals, then that system is broken.
Your second point here has got nothing to do with security of the GEMS software -- it's talking about election processes as a whole, of which the software is only a part. The assumption in the design and implementation of your voting machines and software should be that the other parts of the process might *not* work, not that they are perfect and will excuse any flaws in your system.
Craig.