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Re: Diebold Global Election Management System (GEMS) Backdoor Account Allows Authenticated Users to Modify Votes



Polazzo Justin wrote:


If we don't have any data, then we are making decisions based on
propaganda, no matter what side you listen to.

Of course California suing then does raise questions :) Any state that
implements voting technology that has not been verified by independent
means needs rethink their approach. Any state could use the resources at
their disposal to evaluate these systems independently at a very low
cost, if any at all. (preferably by some local Tech school :)

Either way, without POC, how can we discuss this on bugtraq?

-JP

P.s.:
Even though MS sux out of box, you can turn off the netlogon process on
any windows client, voiding any authentication to the local workstation.
The only authentication that can take place is server based, which can
then be further be restricted through policies and reghacks to kerberos
only. If you then delete the domain accounts as the card is used fears
of locally compromising the systems would be a non issue.

While I am pretty sure this has not been done, it illustrates why we
need to evaluate the code.


http://www.why-war.com/features/2003/10/diebold.html

My question is, why would Diebold attempt to enact the DMCA if they didn't have something to hide? I completely agree that propaganda should not be listened to from either side, something smells very fishy here.

Also agreed on the server authentication, but what happens if I happen to get a copy of that Access DB and throw it on another computer? If an electronic trail isn't there, a paper trail should be.

For a more mainstream article on this subject, you can also check out the NYT:

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/19/politics/campaign/19vote.html?pagewanted=print&position=

As far as a POC and a local tech school auditing the code, I'm all for it, but the campaign contributions aren't.

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