Re: Can we prevent IE exploits a priori?
Drew Copley wrote:
> I have not seen evidence that either of these applications
> prevents new exploits. If anyone is making this claim, they
> should explain what technology they are using.
>
> The required fix is simply setting a kill bit on the vulnerable
> activex objects.
In response to security-bugtraq@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>>I don't mean to flame you
>>Thor, as your client list is certainly impressive:
>>(http://pivx.com/clients.html) I just can't seem to get your
>>program from anywhere.
>>
>>So I wanted to know, has anyone tried these programs
>>successfully? Can anyone validate their claims? Better yet,
>>does anyone have a link to a "how to" doc, that tells smart
>>geeks how to make the registry changes ourselves, so we don't
>>have to rely on some program to do it for us?
Aloha, Drew and MarketShark.net.
To answer your last question first, I wrote an article recently for Dr.
Dobb's that you may find helpful as you figure out how to harden the IE
My Computer/Local Machine zone yourself.
Dr. Dobb’s Windows Security, June 18, 2004
IE’s Local Machine Zone and the Attack of the TLAs
http://www.ddj.com/documents/s=9207/ddj040618sec/
As Thor Larholm pointed out to Drew Copley on July 3rd, the kill bit is
good but preventing all scripting of controls in the My Computer Zone is
better. This is the sort of security hardening for IE that Qwik Fix
provides. See http://www.qwik-fix.net
Thor Larholm wrote:
>The prerequisite for even having privileges enough to launch the
>Shell.Application ActiveX object inside IE is to have script running in
>the My Computer zone. Locking down this zone will completely prevent
>this exploit, without introduing functionality regressions in other
>parts of Windows.
Qwik Fix does set the kill bit on bad controls, and will set the kill
bit on controls that are not bad but are a risk, but only when there is
not a better technical solution available than setting kill bits.
There can be little argument that setting the kill bit on each control
that poses a threat when IE's zones are not properly hardened is to
attempt to hit a moving target.
Drew Copley wrote:
The easy to use, free fix for all of these issues:
http://www.eeye.com/html/research/alerts/AL20040610.html
It is not free if a paid employee of the company has to spend time doing
it. Although the eeye registry fixer tool may be useful to some, the
fact that registry hacks like the ones that eeye recommends often have
to be backed out temporarily to do something that has been blocked by
the new setting, and then re-implemented after that action is complete,
makes it necessary to have a trusted software agent that does these
security hardening and temporary unhardening steps for us automatically
at runtime.
The user knows when they are browsing the Web and when they aren't --
therefore the user gets to decide when the protection should be present
and when it should not be. This is a security context decision that a
simple registry hack cannot make at runtime, and that in the end we have
to be able to rely on the end user to understand. More importantly, we
need the end user to be capable of exerting specific information
security skill and knowledge with the click of a mouse in a consistent
and manageable fashion.
My experience has been that end users do understand the difference
between browsing the Web and printing a file to their printer, for
example, and there are instances where security registry hacks will
disable printing or some other mundane, low-risk activity. That the end
user must take action to unharden a box long enough to print is an
unfortunate reality of poor security design in printer manufacturer's
user interfaces, and we all just have to live with and adapt our boxes
around these realities.
If you mess up you will make it very difficult for users to
browse the web and they will manually change the settings and
likely end up getting spyware running automatically on their
systems -- or worse.
Again the reference to "you" as distinct from the "users" themselves
makes it clear that you are thinking of the problem only from one
perspective. End users will always manually change settings when not
given an easy way to bypass barriers to getting things done. Spyware
will do it for them without their knowledge. The "you" in the real world
is often the end user themself, reinstallation of a Windows
hotfix/service pack, and so forth. When "you" does refer to a system or
network administrator, they know very well that even when they don't
mess up, things still go wrong and settings get changed.
A software agent like Qwik Fix that knows how to harden and unharden or
reharden a Windows box solves the "if you mess up" problem, no matter
who, or what, "you" it is that is responsible for messing it up (again).
There are hundreds of thousands of Qwik Fix users to date, and the
response to the software from other infosec peers has been very
positive. After Scob there was an outpouring of gratitude expressed from
people who realized that the software protected them in advance.
This is pretty convincing proof that the product protects against new
exploits by solving root problems that allow them to occur. I personally
was impressed enough to join the company. (note sig below)
Sincerely,
Jason Coombs
jasonc@xxxxxxxxxxx
Director of Forensic Services
PivX Solutions, Inc.
http://www.pivx.com