Shaun Colley wrote: []
Below is the vulnerable call: --- if (NULL == (tmp = kmalloc(optlen + 1, GFP_KERNEL))) { retval = -ENOMEM; goto out_unlock; } --- Because kmalloc() takes the 'count' variable as an unsigned number, negative numbers are interpreted as large unsigned numbers. However, if -1 is passed as 'optlen' (represented as 0xffffffff (hex) in unsigned variables, which is the largest value an unsigned
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And thus, due to the integer overflow, 0 is passed to kmalloc(), causing too little memory to be allocated to hold 'optval'.
But kmalloc(0) will return NULL, and the whole setsockopt will finish with errno set to ENOMEM. From 2.4 mm/slab.c: void * kmalloc (size_t size, int flags) { cache_sizes_t *csizep = cache_sizes; for (; csizep->cs_size; csizep++) { if (size > csizep->cs_size) continue; return __kmem_cache_alloc(flags & GFP_DMA ? csizep->cs_dmacachep : csizep->cs_cachep, flags); } return NULL; } So, where's the bug? /mjt