Solaris 9 patch 113579-03 introduces a NIS security bug
[Posted to newsgroup comp.unix.solaris,
and mailed to bugtraq@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]
Patch 113579-03, which has been in the recommended patch set for
Solaris 9 since mid-February, introduces a security bug.
If you are not running a NIS server using Solaris 9 you are not
affected. If you do, but don't have any secure maps (as made
by "makedbm -s"), you are still not affected. The commonest use
of secure maps is probably as part of the "c2secure" setup, in
which the encrypted passwords are kept in a separate secure map
"passwd.adjunct.byname".
The bug simply causes secure NIS maps not to be treated as secure
any longer. This means that any user on a NIS client (rather than
just the super-user) can use ypcat(1) and ypmatch(1) to extract
the contents of a secure map such as "passwd.adjunct.byname".
We discovered this bug accidentally, and reported it to Sun on
Monday 29 March. They quickly confirmed the bug: we have no
complaints on that score. However, in the three weeks since
then they have failed to withdraw the faulty patch or issue
any security alert to Solaris users on the subject. We think
this is unreasonable: therefore we are making this information
publicly available.
If you are affected by the security problem, then we advise you
to remove patch 113579-03 with patchrm(1m) and then restart the
NIS daemons, which will re-secure the relevant NIS maps. You might
need to bear in mind that 113579-03 replaced /var/yp/Makefile
and that therefore patchrm'ing it will cause it to revert to
the version before the patchadd, and also that patch 113579-03
obsoleted 113483-02 as well as 113579-01.
We've been told that Solaris 9 4/04 comes with patch 113579-04
pre-applied: this version of the patch is not yet available
separately. We believe that it probably has the same security
bug as 113579-03, but have not yet been able to test this
ourselves.
We are, of course, aware that using secure NIS maps is only a
small part of securing NIS configurations (insofar as that can
be done at all).
--
Chris Thompson University of Cambridge Computing Service,
Email: cet1@xxxxxxxxxxxxx New Museums Site, Cambridge, UK.