Re: IPv4 fragmentation --> The Rose Attack
On Wed, Mar 31, 2004 at 03:07:31PM -0500, stanislav shalunov wrote:
> <gandalf@xxxxxxxxxxx> writes:
>
> > While this discussion pertains to IPv4, IPv6 also allows fragmentation and I
> > suspect IPv6 will also be affected by this attack.
>
> IPv6 does not have en-route fragmentation and, therefore, has no
> reassembly. IPv6 is not affected.
IPv6 does have end-station fragmentation, and therefore, it DOES have
reassebly, see Section 4.5 of RFC2460. I do not see why an IPv6
implementation would not also potentially be affected.
This is YANFA, Yet Another IP Fragmentation Attack. Teardrop, Ping O'
Death, NewTear, Boink, yada-yada. Some have exploited bugs in
reassembly code (over lapping frags, >65535-byte packets, etc.) and
others, like this, are flat out resource exhaustion DoSes.
The IP stack needs to be sane about how many datagrams it will try to
reassemble at once. This attack points out that when considering that,
you need to account for the fact a malicious attacker might eat
reassembly resources much faster than his bandwidth would seem to
indicate (two small packets can look like almost 65535). The other
approach is for the reassembly algorithm has to be careful about how
it allocates buffers for reassembly.
--
Crist J. Clark | cjclark@xxxxxxxxxxxx
| cjclark@xxxxxxx
http://people.freebsd.org/~cjc/ | cjc@xxxxxxxxxxx