terminatorX 3.8.1 local vulnerabilities
- 0x333 OUTSIDERS SECURITY LABS -
- www.0x333.org -
~~~~~~~~~ contents ~~~~~~~~~
0x0 Info
0x1 Description
0x2 Stack Overflow in Switch (1)
0x3 Stack Overflow in Switch (2)
0x4 Stack Overflow in $LADSPA_PATH
0x5 Format String Bug in tx_note()
0x6 Solutions
0x7 Vendor Contact
[0x0 Info]
author : c0wboy
mail : c0wboy@xxxxxxxxxx
date : 7 November 2003
advisory : outsiders-terminatorX-001.txt
vendor : http://terminatorX.cx
category : stack overflow, format bug
platform : linux, unix
[0x1 Description]
>From terminatorX's offcial web page : "terminatorX is a realtime audio
synthesizer that allows
you to "scratch" on digitally sampled audio data (*.wav, *.au, *.ogg, *.mp3,
etc.)" . In Last
version (3.8.1) there are still lots of bugs, that could be used by user to
execute arbitrary
codes with root privileges.
[0x2 Stack Overflow in Switch (1)]
It is possible to overflow a static buffer, by passing a long string after
switch "-f"
(or "--file"). In function parse_args() (src/main.cc) we find the follow
piece of code:
if ((strcmp(argv[i], "-f") == 0) || (strcmp(argv[i], "--file") == 0)) {
++i;
globals.startup_set = argv[i];
The variable "globals.startup_set" will contain our (long) string. After
this the variable
will be passed to function load_tt_part() (src/tX_mastergui.cc) which is
called by main():
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
...
if (globals.startup_set) {
while (gtk_events_pending()) gtk_main_iteration(); gdk_flush();
tX_cursor::set_cursor(tX_cursor::WAIT_CURSOR);
load_tt_part(globals.startup_set);
...
/* src/tX_mastergui.cc */
void load_tt_part(char * buffer)
{
char idbuff[256];
char wbuf[PATH_MAX];
...
strcpy(globals.tables_filename, buffer);
...
strcpy(idbuff, "Failed to access file: \"");
strcat(idbuff, globals.tables_filename);
...
In load_tt_part() our string will be first copied in
"globals.tables_filename", that will
overflow the static buffer idbuff[256]. User could overwrite eip and
executes arbitrary
code.
[0x3 Stack Overflow in Switch (2)]
This case is similar to the first one. Here we can overflow a static buffer
by passing a
long string after option "-r" (or "--rc-file"). In function parse_args()
(src/main.cc) we
if ((strcmp(argv[i], "-r") == 0) || (strcmp(argv[i], "--rc-file") == 0)) {
...
globals.alternate_rc = argv[i];
In function get_rc_name() (src/tX_global.c) there is a unchecked strcpy()
that will overflow
a static buffer (passed to this function as argument) with the content of
"globals.alternate_rc"
variable:
void get_rc_name(char *buffer)
{
strcpy(buffer,"");
if (globals.alternate_rc) {
strcpy(buffer, globals.alternate_rc);
...
This bug can be used to overwrite the eip, and execute arbitrary code.
[0x4 Stack Overflow in $LADSPA_PATH]
In file tX_ladspa.cc, is possible overflow a static buffer by setting a long
"$LADSPA_PATH"
environment variable. As we had before, there is an unchecked strcpy(), in
this case a long string
will overflow "ladspa_path[PATH_MAX]":
void LADSPA_Plugin :: init ()
{
char *ladspa_path_ptr;
char ladspa_path[PATH_MAX];
...
/* Finding the LADSPA Path */
ladspa_path_ptr=getenv("LADSPA_PATH");
...
else strcpy(ladspa_path, ladspa_path_ptr);
...
By overflowing "ladspa_path[PATH_MAX]", eip will be overwritten, permitting
the execution of
arbitrary code.
[0x5 Format String Bug in tx_note()]
There is a format string bug in function tx_note(), that can be found in
src/tX_mastergui.cc. The
problem exists in function "gtk_message_dialog_new()". User can control the
contents of "message"
variable, and set it to special format string parameters (for example lots
of '%x'). Here's the
vulnerable code :
void tx_note(const char *message, bool isError)
{
char buffer[4096]="terminatorX ";
if (isError) {
strcat(buffer, "note:\n\n");
} else {
strcat(buffer, "error:\n\n");
}
strcat(buffer, message);
GtkWidget *dialog=gtk_message_dialog_new(GTK_WINDOW(main_window),
GTK_DIALOG_DESTROY_WITH_PARENT,
isError ? GTK_MESSAGE_ERROR : GTK_MESSAGE_INFO, GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE,
message);
gtk_dialog_run(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)); /*
|_____ fmt bug */
gtk_widget_destroy(dialog);
}
Is possible to exploit this bug, by passing a crafted string after witch
"-f" (or "--file"). TerminatorX
will be run, but it will display a warning-windows showing memory addresses.
There will be a segfault.
[c0wboy@0x333 src]$ ./terminatorX -f %x%x%x%x%x%x%n
terminatorX Release 3.81 - Copyright (C) 1999-2003 by Alexander Knig
terminatorX comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY - for details read the
license.
* tX_error: set_capabilities(): failed to set caps: Operation not permitted.
+ tX_warning: engine_thread_entry(): can't set SCHED_FIFO -> lacking
capabilities.
+ tX_warning: engine_thread_entry() - engine has no realtime priority
scheduling.
+ tX_warning: LADSPA_PATH not set. Trying
/usr/lib/ladspa:/usr/local/lib/ladspa
* tX_error: tX: Error: couldn't access directory "/usr/lib/ladspa".
+ tX_warning: Plugin "Stereo Amplifier" disabled. Not a 1-in/1-out plugin.
+ tX_warning: Plugin "White Noise Source" disabled. Not a 1-in/1-out plugin.
+ tX_warning: Plugin "Sine Oscillator (Freq:audio, Amp:audio)" disabled. Not
a 1-in/1-out plugin.
+ tX_warning: Plugin "Sine Oscillator (Freq:control, Amp:control)" disabled.
Not a 1-in/1-out plugin.
warning: failed to load external entity "%25x%25x%25x%25x%25x%25x%25n"
Segmentation fault
[c0wboy@0x333 src]$
**NOTE** : There are lots of syntax-wrong gtk_message_dialog_new(), in
src/tX_mastergui.cc file.
[0x6 Solutions]
0x1 (switch "-f"):
/* src/tX_mastergui.cc */
void load_tt_part(char * buffer)
{
char idbuff[256];
char wbuf[PATH_MAX];
xmlDocPtr doc;
...
if (strlen(idbuff) + strlen(buffer) > 256-strlen("Failed to access file:
\"")-strlen("\""))
return;
else
strcpy(globals.tables_filename, buffer);
...
This will correctly check the "idbuff" lenght.
0x2 (switch "-r"):
void get_rc_name(char *buffer)
{
strcpy(buffer,"");
if (globals.alternate_rc && (strlen(globals.alternate_rc) <
sizeof(buffer)-1) ) { /* bof fixed */
strcpy(buffer, globals.alternate_rc);
...
0x3 ($ env):
The program already use a funtion to check the environment variables leghnt
(checkenv()).
Just us it in main() also with $LADSPA_PATH.
0x4 (fmt bug):
void tx_note(const char *message, bool isError)
{
char buffer[4096]="terminatorX ";
if (isError) {
strcat(buffer, "note:\n\n");
} else {
strcat(buffer, "error:\n\n");
}
/* - */ strcat(buffer, message);
/* + */ strncat(buffer, sizeof(message), message); /* i don't like this
strcat() ... */
GtkWidget *dialog=gtk_message_dialog_new(GTK_WINDOW(main_window),
GTK_DIALOG_DESTROY_WITH_PARENT,
isError ? GTK_MESSAGE_ERROR : GTK_MESSAGE_INFO, GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE, "%s",
message); /* fmt bug fixed */
...
[0x7 Vendor Contact]
Vendor was informed about the bugs.